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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The general theme running through most of the articles in this symposium is 
that recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded police authority by 
relaxing—or eviscerating—the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” 
standard for arrests and searches. I concur in that assessment: the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have pretty much destroyed the constitutional 
checks against arbitrary police intrusions. However, I write to expose another, 
earlier part of the story that has been almost entirely overlooked: that the now-
accepted doctrine that probable cause alone can justify a criminal arrest or 
search did not emerge until well after the framing of the Bill of Rights in 1789 
and constituted a significant departure from the criminal-procedure standards 
that the Framers of the Bill thought they had preserved. 
Framing-era common-law criminal-procedure doctrine was accusatory in 
character and structured according to assessments of “necessity.” In particular, 
arrest or search authority arose from, and depended upon, a foundational 
accusation by a named and potentially accountable complainant that a crime 
actually had been committed “in fact.” Probable cause could suffice as to the 
identity of the criminal, but not for the fact of the crime. Thus, probable cause 
alone regarding the commission of a crime—what I call “bare probable 
cause”—was not a standard that the Framers intended to apply to criminal 
arrests or searches. 
Instead, the notion that bare probable cause that a crime might have been 
committed suffices to justify a warrantless arrest, or issuance of an arrest 
warrant, dates back only to roughly the middle of the nineteenth century. The 
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notion that bare probable cause suffices to justify a criminal search warrant has 
a similarly short history. Additionally, although the post-framing adoption of 
bare probable cause as the standard for warrantless felony arrests increased 
opportunities for peace officers to make warrantless searches of arrestees 
incident to lawful arrests, the doctrine that bare probable cause could justify a 
warrantless search made other than as an incident of a lawful arrest was not 
invented until the 1920s. Thus, the post-framing adoption of the bare-probable-
cause standard by American judges was itself a drastic relaxation of the arrest 
and search protections that the American Framers thought they had preserved 
in constitutional provisions. 
Indeed, when American judges adopted the bare-probable-cause standard, 
they effectively rejected the accusatory criminal procedure that the Framers had 
undertaken to preserve and instead opened the way for the development of 
modern investigatory criminal procedure. In particular, the adoption of the 
relaxed bare-probable-cause arrest standard facilitated the development of the 
discretionary authority that characterizes modern policing and thus drastically 
increased government criminal-justice power. And all this happened long 
before recent Supreme Court opinions drained the modern bare-probable-
cause standard of significant content. 
The reason this story will be unfamiliar is that the conventional history of 
what is now referred to as “search and seizure” doctrine has been shaped by 
bogus claims about the historical Fourth Amendment that appear in modern 
Supreme Court opinions. According to that account, the Framers intended for 
the first clause of the Fourth Amendment to create an across-the-board 
“reasonableness” standard for all government searches and seizures. Moreover, 
because “probable cause” was explicitly stated as the required justification for 
particularized warrants in the second clause of the Amendment, modern 
opinions have also construed bare probable cause to be the general 
“touchstone” for assessing “Fourth Amendment reasonableness.”1 Thus, the 
modern Supreme Court has treated bare probable cause that a crime might 
have been committed as the basic Fourth Amendment standard for justifying 
government arrests and searches, whether made with or without a warrant. 
Indeed, modern Supreme Court opinions have even claimed that bare probable 
cause has always been the general common-law arrest and search standard. 
However, these judicial-chambers concoctions bear little resemblance to the 
actual history of arrest and search authority. The first rule for recovering 
authentic constitutional history is to discount any historical claim that appears 
 
 1. The Fourth Amendment reads, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The italicized first clause is now often referred to as the 
“Reasonableness Clause,” while the unitalicized second clause is referred to as the “Warrant Clause.” 
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in a judicial opinion. This is necessary because judicial opinions are exercises in 
justification, not reports of rigorous research.2 Moreover, because “we have 
always done it that way”—that is, precedent—is the most basic criterion for 
legal justification, judges have routinely pretended to be merely applying prior 
law when they actually departed from it and innovated—sometimes drastically. 
As a result, judicial opinions regarding arrest and search law tend to bury the 
actual history of doctrinal change under successive layers of fabricated myth3—
and that has also been the case with other aspects of criminal procedure.4 
Indeed, this obscurantist tendency has been especially pronounced when, as 
currently, judges purport to adhere to the “original meaning” of constitutional 
provisions—an approach that often consists largely of creative or even arbitrary 
textualism rather than significant historical inquiry.5 
 
 2. Professor Reid has nicely summed up judicial use of history: 
Today a judge writing a decision in, let us suppose, a native American land case, does not say 
to his clerk, “What rule does history support?” Rather, the judge tells her, “We’re going to 
adopt such-and-such rule. Find me some history to support it.” It will not matter to the judge 
or his colleagues on the court the quality of the historical evidence that she finds. 
John Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography 
of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO–AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 228 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 
1993). 
 3. This indictment of judicial-chambers history is based on nearly two decades of research into 
historical arrest and search law. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth] (documenting that the 
Fourth Amendment was originally understood only to set warrant standards, but not to create any 
generalized reasonableness standard for warrantless arrests or searches); Thomas Y. Davies, The 
Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of 
Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) 
[hereinafter Davies, Arrest] (contrasting actual framing-era arrest law to the historical claims in recent 
Supreme Court opinions); Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten 
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 
77 MISS. L.J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Correcting History] (documenting that the law of arrest was 
a salient component of “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions, rather than of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 4. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The 
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 
TENN. L. REV. 987 (2003) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fifth Amendment] (documenting the difference 
between the original understanding of the right against compelled self-accusation and the 
understanding asserted in recent Supreme Court opinions); Thomas Y. Davies, Not the “Framers’ 
Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis 
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Confrontation Right, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007) 
[hereinafter Davies, Not the Framers’ Design] (documenting the difference between the original 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and the understanding asserted in recent 
Supreme Court opinions). 
 5. In normal usage, “original meaning” would connote the way the persons involved in the 
adoption of a constitutional provision understood that text at the time of its adoption. But the justices 
and commentators who identify themselves as “originalists” do not seek out the actual historical 
meaning of a provision, but parse the language of the text with a historical dictionary to arrive at what 
they term the “original public meaning.” In practice, the creative textualism that can be accomplished 
by this method allows the “originalist” justices and commentators to impose their own preferred 
meaning on the text while pretending to adhere to the “original meaning”—even though their version 
bears little similarity to the historical meaning. Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out 
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Moreover, until quite recently, academic constitutional histories were 
overwhelmingly sycophantic and undertook merely to embellish the Supreme 
Court’s judicial-chambers concoctions. As a result, the conventional academic 
histories generally exhibit the same fictions as the judicial history.6 The overall 
result is that our constitutional past is actually a quite foreign and only poorly 
explored territory. 
To get the history right, it is necessary to disregard the prochronistic7 
expectations embedded in the conventional history as to how the history “must” 
connect up somehow with current doctrine. Instead, it is necessary to 
reconstruct the authentic past directly from the pertinent historical materials 
themselves—while resisting, so far as possible, one’s own preexisting 
conceptions. Then one must work forward in time while paying close attention 
to indications of departures, innovations, and changes. If one does that, the 
story of probable cause is fairly clear, but quite different from the story that 
readers familiar with the conventional history will expect. 
Indeed, the notion that the Fourth Amendment was meant to be the 
primary constitutional provision to regulate arrest and search standards is itself 
only a modern judicial invention. The real history is that the Fourth 
Amendment was only a focused response to the then-recent controversy over 
the use of general warrants for revenue searches of houses—that is, searches to 
enforce customs and excise taxes. As a result, the text of the Fourth 
Amendment and its reference to “unreasonable searches and seizures”—which 
was a pejorative label for the gross illegality of searches and seizures made 
under unparticularized, and thus unjustified, general warrants—sheds little light 
on the Framers’ understanding of criminal arrest and search standards. Mere 
“reasonableness” never constituted a justification for a criminal arrest or search 
at the time of the framing. Likewise, the most plausible explanation why the 
federal Framers adopted bare probable cause as the standard for issuing valid 
warrants was that they were concerned primarily with regulating revenue search 
warrants, and that was the one area where bare probable cause had emerged as 
the accepted standard for issuance of search warrants. 
In contrast to the modern myths, the historical record actually indicates that 
the American Framers intended to preserve common-law arrest and search 
standards—standards that appeared to be settled and uncontroversial during 
the framing era—in the “law of the land” and “due process of law” clauses that 
they included in the initial state declarations of rights and in the “due process of 
 
Which Aspects of Giles’s Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not “Established at the 
Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 670–71 (2009). 
 6. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 27–28 (criticizing the conventional history of 
the Fourth Amendment); id. at 39–43 (criticizing the conventional history of the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause). 
 7. A “prochronism” is a specific form of anachronism in which aspects of a later period in time 
are erroneously imposed on an earlier period. Prochronistic expectations pose a serious obstacle to 
recovering accurate legal history. 
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law” clause of the federal Fifth Amendment.8 Indeed, the judicial-chambers and 
conventional accounts of arrest history are so defective that they virtually omit 
any mention of these provisions that explicitly forbade a person being “taken” 
or “arrested” except according to “the law of the land” or “due process of law.” 
Yet those provisions were included in the initial American declarations of rights 
more often than provisions that banned general warrants. Hence, to recover the 
authentic history of arrest and search authority—and the role that bare 
probable cause plays in that story—one must put aside modern Fourth 
Amendment mythology. 
This article undertakes to disentangle the authentic history of bare probable 
cause from the judicial and conventional myths by telling the story that actually 
appears in the historical sources. Part II describes the common-law arrest and 
search standards that were quite consistently set out in the common-law 
authorities ranging from Sir Edward Coke’s early-seventeenth-century writings 
through the other leading treatises and justice-of-the-peace manuals that 
Americans consulted during the framing era. It explains that common-law 
criminal procedure was accusatory rather than investigatory, and that the 
foundational component of the common-law standards for a warrantless arrest 
or issuance of an arrest or criminal search warrant was a sworn accusation, by a 
named and potentially accountable complainant (there was no such thing as a 
“confidential informant”), that a crime actually had been committed “in fact”—
not mere probable cause to think a crime might have been committed. It also 
explains why framing-era Americans understood that the accusatory arrest and 
search standards constituted salient components of the Cokean conception of 
“the law of the land” and its near synonym, “due process of law.” Because these 
common-law arrest and search standards seemed well settled, the American 
state and federal Framers were content to invoke them simply by using the 
traditional labels, expecting (wrongly, as it would turn out) that American 
judges would zealously preserve and protect those common-law standards. 
Part III then explains how “probable cause” standing alone—what I call 
“bare probable cause”—came to be included as the minimum justification for 
issuance of a warrant in the Fourth Amendment. Bare probable cause had 
emerged as a standard in English law for revenue search warrants for untaxed 
or smuggled goods. The most likely explanation for this departure from the 
criminal-procedure crime-in-fact requirement was that customs and excise 
enforcement lacked the victim–complainants upon whom accusatory criminal 
procedure usually relied. Thus, customs and excise search warrants were 
necessarily issued on a revenue officer’s showing of probable cause to suspect 
smuggling or tax evasion, rather than upon an accusation that a violation had 
actually occurred in fact. 
 
 8. For clarity, I depart from the usual convention and use “due process of law” when referring to 
the framing-era understanding and “Due Process” when referring to the broader modern meaning. 
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This part also explains that the federal Framers were especially concerned 
with regulating the use of warrants for customs or excise searches of houses—
but that they had conflicting interests. On the one hand, they knew that customs 
and excise collections would be the primary source of revenue for the new 
national government. On the other hand, they were well aware that 
Parliament’s approval of the use of unparticularized “general warrants” for 
customs searches of houses in the American colonies had given rise to an 
important prerevolutionary grievance and also well aware that Anti-Federalists 
had reignited that grievance during the ratification debates of 1787–1788 by 
warning that the new Congress would authorize general warrants for revenue 
searches of houses. To quiet those fears, the federal Framers definitively 
banned the use of unparticularized general warrants in the Fourth Amendment. 
But to avoid hamstringing federal revenue collections, the Framers adopted the 
bare-probable-cause standard for search warrants that had emerged in English 
revenue law, rather than the more-stringent crime-in-fact standard for common-
law criminal warrants. Notably, however, nothing in the legislative history of 
the Bill of Rights indicates that the federal Framers imagined they were 
displacing the settled common-law criminal arrest and search standards when 
they adopted bare probable cause as the minimum standard for issuance of 
particularized warrants in the Fourth Amendment. 
Part IV describes how nineteenth-century courts began to adopt bare 
probable cause as a general standard for warrantless felony arrests when the 
Cokean tradition of accusatory common-law standards was either lost or 
rejected. The crucial innovation occurred in the early nineteenth century when 
English judges, who were concerned with urban unrest and rising property 
crimes, jettisoned the “felony in fact” requirement for warrantless arrests by 
permitting peace officers (but not private persons) to make warrantless felony 
arrests on the officer’s own assessment of probable cause that a felony might 
have been committed. American state judges, who shared much the same 
concerns as their English counterparts, then imported that relaxed standard for 
warrantless felony arrests by peace officers around the middle of the nineteenth 
century (though not without some controversy). By the end of the nineteenth 
century most American jurisdictions accepted bare probable cause—
circumstances indicating that a felony might have been committed—as the 
standard for warrantless felony arrests. 
The importance attached to probable cause during this period seems to have 
prompted courts to define the concept more precisely, and they settled on a 
fairly uniform definition by the late nineteenth century; namely, that probable 
cause existed when reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent 
person in the belief that the person who was to be arrested had committed a 
crime, or that evidence or contraband would be found in the particular place to 
be searched. Notwithstanding this definition, the new bare-probable-cause 
standard provided police officers with significant discretion to decide when to 
make arrests, and that discretionary authority had such far-reaching effects that 
it was the catalyst for the transformation of criminal procedure. Notably, it does 
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not appear that American judges paid much attention to constitutional 
provisions while this transformation played out. Rather, the standards for 
warrantless arrests by police officers seem to have been effectively 
deconstitutionalized during this period. 
Part V describes how bare probable cause also took on further importance 
during the early twentieth century when the Supreme Court invented what we 
now call “search and seizure” doctrine by reinventing the Fourth Amendment. 
In the initial Fourth Amendment cases the justices largely reconstitutionalized 
the old common-law rule, rooted in the earlier Cokean conception of “the law 
of the land,” that an arrest or search in a house required a criminal warrant. But 
the justices did so by reading an implicit warrant requirement into the text of 
the Fourth Amendment, rather than by treating that requirement as a requisite 
of the “due process of law” required by the Fifth Amendment. However, the 
scope of the warrant requirement became problematic when Prohibition 
presented the federal courts with a need to address whether and how the Fourth 
Amendment should apply to the searches of automobiles that would be 
necessary if police were to be able to enforce Prohibition by seizing illegal 
liquor. 
As a practical matter, it was not feasible for police to obtain warrants for 
searches of automobiles. But there was a doctrinal obstacle to justifying 
warrantless searches of automobiles. A warrantless search for illegal liquor 
could not be justified as a search made incident to a lawful arrest because 
Prohibition violations were typically misdemeanors rather than felonies, but 
American courts had adopted bare probable cause as a justification for only 
warrantless felony arrests, not for misdemeanor arrests. With regard to 
warrantless misdemeanor offenses, American courts still applied the common-
law rule that a warrantless arrest could be made only when an officer actually 
observed an on-going breach of the peace. But that standard could not be met 
because the illegal liquor in automobiles was rarely in plain view when the 
vehicle was stopped. 
In response to this doctrinal impediment, federal judges began to read the 
first clause of the Fourth Amendment as though it positively permitted any 
search that could be said to be “reasonable” in the circumstances—regardless of 
whether it was incident to a lawful arrest—and thus announced that warrantless 
searches of automobiles for liquor were “not unreasonable”—and thus were 
constitutional—so long as the searching officers had bare probable cause that a 
Prohibition offense might be being committed. Notably, it was at this time that 
judges began to construe the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as though it 
constituted a “Reasonableness Clause” that applied independently of the 
standards for valid warrants stated in the second clause. 
Parts VI and VII then bring the story of bare probable cause up to the 
present. Part VI discusses the rulings of the Warren Court that generally 
strengthened, but sometimes undermined, regulation of police conduct. Part 
VII discusses the rulings of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. It first 
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identifies early Burger Court opinions that reinforced the fictional historical 
pedigree ascribed to the bare-probable-cause standard, then discusses the 
Burger Court’s drastic redefinition of bare probable cause as information 
indicating merely a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of criminal 
conduct in Illinois v. Gates9—a formulation that undercut the definition used 
during the previous two-and-a-half centuries. This part also describes two other 
significant relaxations of prior doctrine: the Rehnquist Court’s extension of the 
minimalist notion of bare probable cause to permit warrantless arrests even for 
previously nonarrestable petty offenses in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,10 and 
the Roberts Court’s unanimous but truly bizarre ruling in Virginia v. Moore 
that, because the Fourth Amendment requires only bare probable cause, even 
an unlawful arrest for a nonarrestable offense satisfies Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” provided that the arresting officers had bare probable cause 
that some offense had been committed.11 
Finally, in a brief concluding part I argue that the drastic discontinuities in 
the authentic history of constitutional arrest and search standards demonstrate 
that current constitutional criminal procedure bears little resemblance to that 
which the Framers thought they had preserved. Hence, recent “originalist” 
attempts to portray current doctrine as though it comports with the Framers’ 
understanding have been little more than result-driven fabrications. But I do 
not argue that we should return to the actual original understanding of arrest 
and search authority; far too much has changed for the authentic original 
meanings of the Fifth or Fourth Amendments to answer modern issues or serve 
modern needs. Instead, the primary value of recovering the actual history of 
probable cause is that it illuminates the degree to which judges have expanded 
government arrest and search power during the two centuries since the framing. 
II 
THE COMMON-LAW ARREST AND SEARCH STANDARDS THE FRAMERS 
SOUGHT TO PRESERVE IN “DUE PROCESS OF LAW” 
Several common misconceptions tend to get in the way of appreciating the 
historical common-law standards that informed the Framers’ understanding of 
criminal procedure. One is the conceit of American exceptionalism—the myth 
that the American Framers created novel principles and standards in their 
various declarations and bills of rights. That is not the case with arrest and 
search protections. The state and federal Framers did not undertake to 
formulate new arrest or search standards, but instead undertook to 
constitutionalize—and thereby preserve—the arrest and search standards that 
were already settled elements of the common law.12 
 
 9. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 10. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 11. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 12. A few of the rights protected in the Constitution or Bill of Rights were definitely novel (for 
example, the Nonestablishment Clause), but most restated protections that had been forged in earlier 
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A second misconception is that framing-era common law was too 
inconsistent, inchoate, or confused to form the basis for constitutional 
standards. However, at least with regard to arrest and search doctrine, the 
common-law standards were set out quite consistently in the legal authorities 
that shaped the Framers’ understanding. Because case reports themselves were 
not widely available in America, the most influential legal authorities were the 
treatises that summarized the decided cases13—especially those by Sir Edward 
Coke,14 Sir Matthew Hale,15 and Serjeant William Hawkins16—and derivative 
works that excerpted the more-important points in the treatises. The latter 
included Richard Burn’s leading multi-volume English justice-of-the-peace 
manual17 and the similar manuals, which typically borrowed heavily from 
Burn’s, that were published in framing-era America,18 as well as William 
 
English controversies. See generally, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS (Richard L. 
Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). In particular, the Framers were quite conversant with earlier 
English constitutional history and the language they chose for the criminal-procedure provisions in the 
American declarations and bills of rights largely invoked the settled resolutions of earlier controversies. 
See, e.g., Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 91–92 (discussing the historical origins of the “due 
process of law” and “law of the land” provisions in early state declarations of rights); Davies, Original 
Fourth, supra note 3, at 669–74 (discussing the origins and historical understanding of the term “law of 
the land”). 
 13. See Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional 
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 143–44 (2005) [hereinafter Davies, 
Crawford]. 
 14. EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (four volumes, first published 
1628–1644). For bibliographic information, see 1 A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH 
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 21, 258, 360, 449–52, 546 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell 
eds., 2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter Maxwell]. 
 15. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (two volumes, Sollum Emlyn 
ed., 1736). For bibliographic information, see 1 Maxwell, supra note 14, at 362. Hale’s treatise was still 
only in draft form when he died in 1676. 1 HALE, supra, at i n.a, xiv–xvi. 
 16. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (two volumes, first published 
1716 & 1721) [hereinafter HAWKINS]. Several subsequent editions were published in 1771 with no 
significant changes to the text. For bibliographic information, see 1 Maxwell, supra note 14, at 362–63. 
Thomas Leach edited a 1787 edition of Hawkins’s treatise in which Leach added substantial new 
material to the existing text. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
(Thomas Leach ed. 1787) [hereinafter LEACH’S HAWKINS]. 
 17. RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (1755). Multi-volume 
editions of this work were published into the nineteenth century. See 1 Maxwell, supra note 14, at 225–
26; see also Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 4, at 415 (discussing the prominence of Burn’s 
manual). Because Burn’s manual was constantly revised during the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
it is especially valuable for determining continuity or change in doctrine. 
 18. Four substantial justice-of-the-peace manuals were published in America between 1765 and 
1789, each of which borrowed heavily from Burn’s English manual. The earliest is CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS (James Parker ed., Woodbridge, N.J., 1765). Several later editions of this manual were 
published, including a 1788 edition printed in New York City by John Patterson for Robert Hodge (the 
edition cited in this article), and a second, slightly different 1788 edition printed in New York City by 
Hugh Gaine. The three other substantial American justice-of-the-peace manuals are AN ABRIDGMENT 
OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (Joseph Greenleaf ed., Boston, 1773) 
[hereinafter GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGMENT]; RICHARD STARKE, OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (Williamsburg, Va. 1774); and SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE (Philadelphia, 
1788) (attributed to John Fauchaud Grimke, Davies, Crawford, supra note 13, at 185 n.256). See also 
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Blackstone’s Commentaries.19 Notably, the treatment of arrest and search 
authority in these works was little changed from that which had appeared in 
Coke’s writings in the early seventeenth century.20 
A. The Accusatory Character of Framing-Era Common-Law Arrest and 
Search Standards 
Framing-era criminal-procedure doctrine was accusatory rather than 
investigatory in character.21 In contrast to modern procedure, the government 
was usually not authorized to investigate to discover criminal activity or even to 
collect evidence for prosecutions.22 (The primary exception was the coroner’s 
inquest regarding possible homicides.)23 Indeed, except when executing a 
judicially issued warrant, a peace officer such as a constable generally had no 
more arrest or search authority than did a private person.24 Instead, the 
government usually provided only a forum for adjudicating a private 
complainant’s accusation of crime, and the legal force—in the form of arrest 
authority—to compel the accused’s attendance at trial. The evidence-gathering, 
initiation, and prosecution of a criminal charge depended primarily on the 
initiative of a named complainant who was willing to take the risks that 
accompanied that role,25 namely: (1) the potential for physical resistance to an 
 
Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 280 n.122 (providing a more-complete discussion of American justice-
of-the-peace manuals). 
 19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (four volumes first 
published 1765, 1766, 1768, 1769). To avoid prochronistic errors, the citations to Blackstone’s 
Commentaries in this article are to the edition that framing-era Americans would have consulted, the 
first American edition printed by Robert Bell in Philadelphia in 1771–1772.  See Davies, Correcting 
History, supra note 3, at 51 n.135 (discussing the importance of consulting the editions of treatises 
actually used by framing-era Americans). 
 20. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 72–81. 
 21. Although historical doctrine is well preserved, we have very little information regarding actual 
practice. The original understanding of the constitutional provisions dealing with criminal procedure 
was shaped by the prevailing doctrine, not by the departures from doctrine that occurred in practice. 
There is reason to think that actual practice always tends to shortcut doctrine to some degree. 
 22. It is sometimes contended, though, that the conduct of examinations of the arrestee and of 
witnesses against the arrestee during Marian committal proceedings by justices of the peace were 
equivalent to modern police interrogations. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., majority opinion). The comparison is inapt in a variety of ways. See Davies, Crawford, supra 
note 13, at 202–04. 
 23. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 271. 
 24. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 80–81 (“[A]s to the justifying of such Arrests by the 
Constable’s own Authority; it seems difficult to find any Case, wherein a Constable is impowered to 
arrest a Man for a Felony committed or attempted, in which a private Person might not as well be 
justified in doing it . . . ”). 
 25. See, for example, the following description of criminal justice in Boston: 
Through the eighteenth century the use of legal force was ordinarily a direct response to the 
demands of private citizens for help. The victim of robbery or assault called a watchman, if 
available, and afterward applied to a justice for a warrant and a constable to make or aid in 
the arrest. The business of detection was largely a private matter, with the initiative 
encouraged through a system of rewards and fines paid to informers. Neither state nor town 
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arrest (which generally was lawful if the arrest was not legally justified);26 and 
(2) the potential for liability for damages in a subsequent civil lawsuit for 
trespass, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution if the arrestee was not 
convicted of the crime for which the arrest was made. Being a complainant was 
not to be taken lightly.27 
Additionally, mere “reasonableness” never sufficed to justify a criminal 
arrest or search in common-law procedure.28 Even probable cause that a crime 
might have been or likely had been committed—the modern formulation that I 
call “bare probable cause”—never sufficed to justify either a warrantless arrest 
or search, or even issuance of an arrest warrant or search warrant. Rather, at 
common law, an arrest or search usually was justified only if there was both (1) 
a sworn accusation that a crime actually had been committed “in fact” and (2) a 
sworn factual showing of at least “probable cause of suspicion” (alternatively 
stated as “reasonable cause of suspicion”) as to who had committed the crime. 
Of the two, the required accusation that a crime had been committed “in fact” 
was the more fundamental—so much so that common-law authorities often 
used the term “fact” as a synonym for the crime charged.29 “Probable cause of 
suspicion,” though, applied only to the identity of culprit or the location of 
stolen goods, not to the commission of the crime. 
Common-law procedure was also far more focused on arrest authority than 
on search authority. That was partly because, in the absence of forensic science 
or possessory crimes such as drug offenses, there was little in the way of 
tangible evidence to be searched for other than stolen goods. Additionally, the 
focus on arrest standards reflected the degree to which arbitrary arrests, made 
on order of the crown, had been a salient historical abuse of criminal-justice 
power in English constitutional history.30 Perhaps in response to that historical 
 
made any provision for the identification or pursuit of the unknown offender, except perhaps 
through the coroner’s inquest. 
ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822–1885 7 (1967). 
 26. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 625. 
 27. It appears that the remedy for an innocent person who was the subject of a warrantless arrest 
was an action for false imprisonment, see infra note 37 and notes 189–91 and accompanying text, while 
the redress for an innocent person arrested by warrant was an action for malicious prosecution, see infra 
note 80. Additionally, a householder could obtain damages in a trespass action for an unlawful, 
warrantless “breaking” of a house, or for an unsuccessful warrant search for stolen goods. See infra 
notes 94–95 and accompanying text. Little seems to be known as to how often such damage remedies 
were pursued or won. 
 28. Framing-era sources sometimes used the terminology of “reasonable cause of suspicion” as a 
synonym for “probable cause of suspicion.” 
 29. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 75 (“[T]o raise a Hue and Cry, you ought to go to the 
Constable of the next Town, and declare the Fact, and describe the Offender, and the Way he is gone . . 
. .”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 301 (noting that the name of the township “in which the fact was 
committed” must be included in an indictment). See also infra note 120 and accompanying text, and 
note 176 (discussing the use of the “evidence of a fact committed” standard in several of the state bans 
against general warrants). 
 30. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 45–47 (discussing the arrest controversies that 
prompted the Petition of Right in 1628). 
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abuse, common-law authorities tended to assess criminal-justice authority in 
terms of “necessity.” 
Thus, in his 1790–1791 lectures on law in Philadelphia, James Wilson 
borrowed from Blackstone in making the following statement: 
Every wanton, or causeless, or unnecessary act of authority, exerted, or authorized, or 
encouraged by the legislature over the citizens, is wrong, and unjustifiable, and 
tyrannical: for every citizen is, of right, entitled to liberty, personal as well as mental, 
in the highest possible degree, which can consist with the safety and welfare of the 
state. [We are servants of the law so we can be free.]31 
Likewise, Blackstone, following earlier authorities, described authority for 
warrantless arrest as arising from the “necessity of the thing.”32 This necessity 
criterion is readily apparent in the general restriction of criminal arrest and 
search authority to instances of crimes committed “in fact,” as well as in the 
usual restriction of warrantless arrest authority to only the most serious criminal 
charges. 
B. Warrantless-Arrest Standards 
Warrantless-arrest authority was much broader for accusations of felony in 
fact than for accusations of less-serious offenses.33 The reasons are apparent: It 
was most important for public safety to catch and punish the potentially 
dangerous criminals who committed the set of very serious and often violent 
crimes denoted as felonies; and the severe punishment inflicted on a convicted 
felon—often death and complete forfeiture of property—were especially likely 
to prompt the accused to flee. In contrast, because there was less urgency to 
arrest for less-than-felony offenses, common law permitted warrantless arrests 
for nonfelony offenses only in certain situations.34 
1. Warrantless Arrests for Felony Offenses 
Common law provided two alternate grounds upon which a warrantless 
felony arrest could be lawful. The first was an ex post justification: The arrest 
was lawful if the arrestee was subsequently convicted of the felony. This actual-
guilt justification reflected both an earlier tradition of ex post justification and 
practical reality. In the absence of an exclusionary rule, the legality of an arrest 
 
 31. 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 649 (Robert G. McCloskey ed. 1967) (bracketed passage 
translated from Latin); cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 122 (“[E]very wanton and causeless 
restraint of the will of the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is 
a degree of tyranny.”). 
 32. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 127 (“[Authority for confining or detaining a person] may 
arise either from some process of the courts of justice; or from some warrant from a legal officer having 
power to commit, under his hand and seal, and expressing the cause of such commitment; or from some 
other special cause warranted, for the necessity of the thing, either by common law, or act of parliament; 
such as the arresting of a felon by a private person without a warrant . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 33. Common law defined the category of felonies more narrowly than modern criminal law. For 
example, such relatively serious crimes as assaults, battery, wounding, kidnapping, or even attempts to 
commit felonies were not deemed felonies. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 215–16. 
 34. Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 321–26. 
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could be tested only after the arrestee’s trial (or after the complainant failed to 
prosecute), and a convicted felon was in no position to bring a trespass action. 
Indeed, because there was no writ of error from a criminal conviction, and 
death was a common penalty for felony, a conviction was often quite final.35 
Thus, framing-era authorities usually listed the guilt (conviction) of a person 
arrested for a felony as a justification of a felony arrest.36 
The alternative justification for a warrantless arrest—and the justification 
that was probably most important to a person considering whether to make an 
arrest—was ex ante, and it applied if the arrestee was “innocent”—that is, not 
actually convicted of the felony either because the arrest was dismissed, the 
arresting person failed to prosecute, or the defendant was acquitted at trial. In 
that case, an arrestee could test the lawfulness of the arrest in an “action”—a 
lawsuit for damages—against the arresting persons.37 Under the ex ante 
standard, a warrantless arrest was lawful only if (1) the arresting person could 
prove a felony had been committed in fact, and (2) the arresting person could 
prove information sufficient to establish “probable cause of suspicion” that the 
arrestee was the suspected felon.38 Moreover, the use of Marian committal and 
bail procedure (so named because it was required by statutes enacted during 
the reign of Mary Tudor) meant that the arresting person needed to be 
prepared to make at least a strong showing on these points immediately after an 
arrest was made.39 
 
 35. There was no writ of error permitting appeal of a criminal conviction in the federal courts until 
the late nineteenth century. Davies, Selective Originalism, supra note 5, at 617 n.63. During the framing 
era, a motion for a new trial was usually the only form of review of a felony conviction. 
 36. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 631–32. This actual-guilt justification was sometimes 
stated simply by referring to the validity of an arrest of a “felon”—a term that connoted a person who 
had actually committed a felony. This justification has fallen into disuse and effectively disappeared 
from modern doctrine. See infra note 245. 
 37. The damages remedy for a warrantless arrest was an action for false imprisonment, which was 
usually accompanied by a claim of assault and battery. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 127, 138. If 
the warrantless arrest was not immediately dismissed by the justice of the peace during the committal 
proceeding, and particularly if the grand jury indicted the arrestee, it appears that the arrestee would 
have had to bring an action for malicious prosecution, which appears to have been harder to win. See 
infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
The ex ante justification could also come into play if the arrestee killed a person who had attempted to 
arrest him and he was prosecuted for homicide. Killing a constable or other person attempting a lawful 
arrest was murder; if the arrest or attempted arrest would have been unlawful, though, the killing was 
only manslaughter, a much less-serious crime. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 625 n.204. 
 38. See, e.g., 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 685 (“It is a general rule, that, at any 
time, and in any place . . . if a treason or felony has been committed, [every private person] is justified 
in arresting even an innocent person, upon his reasonable suspicion that by such person it has been 
committed.”). 
 39. During the framing era, Marian committal procedure served as roughly the equivalent of the 
modern Gerstein probable-cause hearing that is required to test the grounds for a warrantless arrest. 
Under Marian procedure, anyone who made a felony arrest (either with or without warrant) was 
required to promptly take the arrestee to a justice of the peace for the justice to decide whether to bail 
the arrestee, commit him to prison, or release him. The justice was required to take and record, in 
writing, the sworn information of the complainant (often called the “informer”) and any additional 
witnesses the complainant could provide. In effect, this procedure put some pressure on a complainant 
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Failure of proof regarding the first ex ante prong—the fact of a committed 
felony—was said to be “fatal” to the lawfulness of the arrest; in that case the 
arresting person was seriously exposed to trespass liability.40 In some instances 
proving the fact of a felony would not have been problematic, as when a murder 
victim’s body had been found. Proof of the fact of felony could be problematic 
in a case of larceny, though, if the allegedly stolen property was never 
recovered.41 
In contrast, the second prong of the ex ante standard—reasonable or 
probable cause of suspicion as to the identity of the felon—could be met in 
various ways. Thus, the framing-era authorities indicated that this prong could 
be shown by the “common fame of the country” (provided such fame had some 
probable ground), by the person being found in circumstances that raised a 
strong presumption of guilt (such as holding a knife above the body of a victim), 
by the person absconding on learning he had been accused, or by the person’s 
keeping company with known thieves (at least when a theft had occurred).42 
However, these lists of the various grounds of probable suspicion always ended 
with a caution to the effect that “generally no such cause of suspicion . . . will 
justify an arrest, where in Truth no such Crime hath been committed.”43 
There was also a requirement that the person making the arrest had to 
personally suspect the arrestee of being the felon.44 This may sound 
metaphysical, but it likely reflects the evidentiary principle that one could swear 
only to what one personally knew, rather than what one had been told by 
 
to offer prima facie, sworn proof of the guilt of the arrestee contemporaneously with the arrest. See 
Davies, Crawford, supra note 13, at 126–29 (describing the accusatory criminal procedure used in the 
framing era). Because the general rule was that “hearsay is no evidence,” the factual justification for 
the arrest had to be provided by witnesses with personal knowledge of the events and circumstances. 
See generally Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 4 (describing the prominence of the ban 
against hearsay in framing-era evidence doctrine). 
 40. See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 109, 116–17 (New York, Hodge ed. 1788) (extracting an essay by 
Saunders Welch, a London High Constable, advising constables that it is “absolutely necessary” that a 
felony actually have been committed if they are to justify a warrantless arrest, and that a mistake on 
this point would be “fatal”). Cf. 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF 
AMERICAN LAW 244 (1824) (“‘[W]ithout a fact suspicion is no cause of arrest;’ that is, there must be a 
felony or offense, in fact, committed, and suspicion is only to the person.”); 5 id. at 588 (stating that 
arrest without warrant requires proof of felony and reasonable cause of suspicion as to the person). 
 41. See infra notes 180–86 and accompanying text. 
 42. See, e.g., Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 74 n.222, 84 n.257 (listing permissible 
grounds found in framing-era treatises for suspicion that a person was a felon). 
 43. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 76; 1 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 95; 1 id. (1785 ed.), at 
101–02; GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 18, at 22; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 
24–25. Each of these authorities noted that a warrantless felony arrest made on a “hue and cry” was an 
exception: anyone who made an arrest based on the hue and cry was justified even if there had not 
been a felony in fact, though the person who had initially raised the hue and cry would have been 
accountable. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 622, n.198 (describing hue-and-cry 
procedure). 
 44. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 76 (“[N]o Causes of Suspicion whatsoever, let the 
Number and Probability of them be ever so great, will justify the Arrest of an innocent Man, by one 
who is not himself induced by them to suspect him to be guilty . . . .”). 
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others, because “a mere Hearsay is no Evidence.”45 Thus, it appears that the 
requirement of personal suspicion meant that a complainant who initiated a 
warrantless felony arrest had to be prepared to testify to direct knowledge of 
the grounds for suspecting the arrestee (or perhaps be ready to present other 
witnesses who could). The bottom line was that probable cause as to the 
commission of a crime would not suffice; it had to be proved “in fact.” Probable 
cause of suspicion was sufficient only as to the identity of the felon. 
2. Warrantless Arrests for Less-than-Felony Offenses 
Except for borderline felonies,46 some offenses that usually involved 
“strangers” (transients who might escape unless promptly arrested),47 and a few 
serious misdemeanors,48 common law generally did not allow warrantless arrests 
for less than felony offenses. The primary exception was that anyone could 
make a lawful warrantless arrest to stop an ongoing breach of the peace (that is, 
a crime that threatened public order) such as an “affray” (a fight in a public 
place) because, in that instance, prompt arrest was justified by the need to 
restore the public peace. Otherwise, arrests for nonfelony offenses, including a 
completed breach of the peace or other serious misdemeanor, could generally 
be made only pursuant to a warrant issued by a justice of the peace.49 
Additionally, because there was no urgency at all to arrest for petty offenses 
or nuisances, violators were usually subject simply to a summons to appear 
before the local justice of the peace (with the possibility of arrest by warrant if 
the accused failed to appear).50 The principal exception was that constables had 
 
 45. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107 (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1754) (stating that 
“[t]he Attestation of the Witness must be to what he knows, and not to that only which he hath heard, 
for a mere Hearsay is no Evidence”). The framing-era ban against admitting hearsay as evidence was 
quite rigorous and was subject to few exceptions. See Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 4, at 
400–08 (discussing Hawkins’ and Gilbert’s statements of the ban against hearsay evidence). 
 46. For example, a specific rule allowed a temporary arrest in the case of a grievous wounding to 
determine whether the wound was fatal (in which case there was a felony and a warrantless arrest was 
justified). See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 289 (noting warrantless arrest authority “in case 
of felony actually committed, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is like to ensue”). 
 47. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 314–17 (discussing Hawkins’ statements that cheating 
gamblers might be subject to warrantless arrest). 
 48. Hale had identified a few specific misdemeanors involving serious crimes (for example, leaving 
“an infant in the cold to the intent to destroy it”) as being subject to warrantless arrest, but these 
passages were rarely mentioned in other framing-era sources. Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 308–14. 
 49. See, e.g., 1 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 96; 1 id. (1785 ed.) at 103: 
[A] constable may ex officio arrest a breaker of the peace in his view, and keep him in his 
house, or in the stocks till he can bring him before a justice. 
Or any person whatsoever, if an affray be made to the breach of the king’s peace, may 
without any warrant from a magistrate, restrain any of the offenders, to the end the king’s 
peace may be kept; but after the affray is ended, they cannot be arrested without an express 
warrant. 
 50. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 278–80 (discussing summary proceedings before 
justices of the peace for “divers petty pecuniary mulcts [fines], and corporal penalties, . . . [and] many 
disorderly offenses” as being instances in which “it is necessary to summon the party accused”); 2 
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order-maintenance authority to detain public drunks and vagrants, and night 
watchmen may have exercised similar authority to temporarily detain suspicious 
“nightwalkers” until morning.51 
C. The Absence of Warrantless Searches Other than as an Aspect of a Lawful 
Warrantless Arrest 
A silence—virtually no discussion of warrantless searches—in the framing-
era treatises and manuals reveals an important difference between historical 
and modern doctrine. Indeed, except for passages on search warrants for stolen 
goods, the framing-era authorities do not identify criminal search authority at 
all.52 This silence does not mean, however, that there was no expectation a 
person would be searched when a warrantless arrest was made. Quite the 
contrary: it reflects an assumption that thieves would routinely be searched 
when they were caught in the act and arrested.53 It appears that these instances 
were not denoted “searches” because arrest was broadly defined to apply to any 
interference with a person’s liberty to go about his business.54 Hence, it appears 
that a warrantless search was justified if, but only if, a lawful warrantless arrest 
could be made.55 
D. Criminal Arrest Warrants 
Warrants were a far more important form of criminal-justice authority 
during the framing era than they are today. For example, James Wilson said in 
his 1790–1791 lectures that “[a] warrant is the first step usually taken for [the 
apprehension of a criminal].”56 In some instances, lawful arrests or searches 
could be made only by warrant. For example, the general limitation of 
 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 689–90 (“On an indictment for any crime under the 
degree of treason or felony, the process proper to be first awarded, at common law, is a venire facias, 
which, from the very name of it, is only in the nature of a summons to require the appearance of the 
party . . . . On an indictment for felony or treason, a capias [arrest warrant] is always the first process.”). 
 51. Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 345–51. 
 52. For example, Burn’s justice-of-the-peace manual has an entry for “Search Warrant” noting that 
a general warrant to search all suspected houses for felons or stolen goods is invalid. 4 BURN (1770 ed.), 
supra note 17, at 104. But the rest of Burn’s discussion recognizes only the specific search warrant for 
stolen goods, and the only form for a search warrant set out is for stolen goods. Id. at 105–07. 
 53. See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 117 (extracting from an essay by London high 
constable Saunders Welch advising constables that “a thorough search of the [arrested] felon is of the 
utmost consequence to your own safety and . . . by this means he will be deprived of instruments of 
mischief, and evidence may probably be found on him sufficient to convict him . . . .”). 
 54. For example, Blackstone, using “imprisonment” as a synonym for arrest, wrote that “[e]very 
confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house, 
or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, 
at 127. 
 55. The doctrine that a lawful warrantless search could be justified in circumstances which could 
not have justified a lawful warrantless arrest did not appear until the Prohibition cases of the 1920s. See 
infra, part V. 
 56. 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 684. See also Davies, Original Fourth, supra 
note 3, at 641 n.256. 
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nonfelony warrantless arrests to ongoing breaches of the peace, described 
above, meant that a warrant was usually the only way to make a lawful arrest 
for a completed breach of the peace or other serious misdemeanor. 
In addition, a criminal warrant was usually the only way to justify 
“breaking” a house (that is, entering a house by closed door)57 to make an arrest 
or search; hence, breaking a house without a warrant was an actionable 
trespass.58 Although it has been largely overlooked in modern commentaries, 
Coke had written that the requirement of a felony warrant for breaking a house 
was required by Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection.59 Later authorities 
continued to state the need for a criminal warrant to justify breaking a house, 
but disagreed as to whether a misdemeanor warrant, or only a felony warrant, 
could suffice.60 
Warrant authority was also important as a practical matter even when not 
strictly required to justify an arrest. In contrast to modern procedure, a 
warrantless framing-era peace officer usually had no greater arrest authority 
than that possessed by any private person.61 Thus, a warrant greatly enhanced 
the officer’s authority. For one thing, because it was clearly unlawful to resist a 
warrant arrest or search, the warrant conferred increased protection against 
violent resistance. Indeed, arrest warrants sometimes took the form of 
commanding a constable to accompany the private complainant and keep peace 
while the complainant made the arrest.62 Additionally, a warrant largely 
removed a constable’s risk of trespass liability if the arrestee was not ultimately 
convicted of the offense for which he was arrested. That was so because a 
 
 57. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 226 (noting, in a discussion of burglary, that “lifting up 
the latch” of an outer door would constitute “breaking” a house). 
 58. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 642–50 (discussing the importance attached to the 
“Privilege of House” and the doctrine that “a man’s house is his castle”). The primary exceptions to the 
requirement of a warrant were that a house could be entered if a peace officer perceived that violence 
was then occurring inside, or if he was lawfully pursing a fleeing affrayer or felon who ran into a house. 
See id. at 644. However, some authorities stated that a fleeing person could be pursued into a house 
only if he was known to be a felon (actually guilty) but not if he were only under a probable suspicion 
of being the felon. See id. at 645 n.269. 
 59. See 4 COKE, supra note 14, at 177 (stating that Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection 
would be violated if a justice of the peace issued a warrant “upon surmises, for breaking the houses of 
any subjects to search for felons, or stoln goods”). See also Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 
62–64 (discussing the implications of Coke’s statement, and his similar statements in Semayne’s Case, 5 
Coke Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604)). 
The long-unappreciated point is that Coke’s linkage between the “law of the land” protection in Magna 
Carta and the requirement of a felony warrant to justify entering a house to arrest or search removes 
any doubt that the Framers understood that the requirement of a warrant for breaking a house was a 
fundamental principle of the common law. 
 60. Some authorities limited “breaking doors” of houses to felony arrest warrants. Davies, Original 
Fourth, supra note 3, at 645. However, other authorities indicated that doors could be broken to 
execute an arrest warrant based on an indictment for any crime (which would include serious 
misdemeanors). See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 86. 
 61. See supra note 24. 
 62. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 65 (discussing Coke’s concept of an arrest 
warrant); id. at 79 (discussing Hawkins’ concept of an arrest warrant). 
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constable who only executed an arrest warrant was “indemnified” (not 
immunized) by the justice of peace’s warrant.63 
1. Standard for Issuing an Arrest Warrant 
The framing-era standard for issuing a felony or misdemeanor arrest 
warrant was essentially the same as the ex ante standard for a warrantless 
felony arrest: a justice of the peace was authorized to issue a warrant if he was 
satisfied that the complainant’s sworn testimony (1) established that a felony or 
misdemeanor had actually been committed in fact, and (2) also provided factual 
grounds constituting probable cause of suspicion as to the identity of the felon 
or misdemeanant. As Blackstone put it, 
[I]t is fitting [for the justice] to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as 
well to ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without 
which no warrant should be granted; as also to prove the cause and probability of 
suspecting the party against whom the warrant is prayed.64 
The personal assessment of the justice of the peace regarding the fact of 
crime and the grounds of suspicion as to identity were important to the 
rationale for arrest warrants. Writing in the early seventeenth century, Coke 
had insisted that an arrest warrant that would justify breaking a house could be 
issued only after a grand jury had indicted the person to be arrested.65 But Hale 
and later authorities disagreed, asserting that a justice of the peace had 
authority to issue an arrest warrant upon a sworn complaint.66 According to 
Hale, it was proper for a justice of the peace to issue a warrant because “the 
justices . . . are made judges of the reasonableness of the suspicion, and when 
 
 63. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 288 (stating that “a lawful warrant will at all events 
indemnify the officer, who executes the same ministerially”); see also infra note 78 and accompanying 
text. 
 64. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 287 (citing 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 110) (emphasis in 
original). Blackstone distinguished between instances involving a “person accused” (when the 
complainant claimed actual knowledge of the identity of the felon) and “a person suspected” (when the 
complainant offered to show probable cause of suspicion of the identity of the felon): 
[A] justice of peace hath power to issue a warrant to apprehend a person accused of felony, 
though not yet indicted . . . . [H]e may also issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of 
felony, though the original suspicion be not in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant; 
because he is a competent judge of the probability offered to him of such suspicion. But in 
both cases it is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well to ascertain 
that there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without which no warrant should be 
granted; as also to prove the cause and probability of suspecting the party against whom it is 
prayed. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 65. 4 COKE, supra note 14, at 177. 
 66. This was one aspect in which the law had undergone noticeable change since Coke’s time. Coke 
had asserted that no arrest warrant could be issued until a person had been indicted for felony. Hale 
and Hawkins disagreed as to the need for a prior indictment, and instead took the position that a justice 
of the peace could issue a felony arrest warrant if there was an accusation that felony had been 
committed in fact, and the identity of the felon was either known or there was reasonable cause of 
suspicion as to his identity. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 62–67, 76–81. Framing-era 
sources noted this conflict but clearly indicated that the position espoused by Hale and Hawkins had 
carried the day. See id. at 77. 
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they have examined the party accusing touching the reasons of his suspicion, if 
they find the causes of suspicion to be reasonable, it is now become the justice’s 
suspicion as well as theirs.”67 
Hale did allow for some relaxation of the formality of an application for a 
felony arrest warrant: “It is convenient, tho not always necessary, to take an 
information upon oath of the person that desires the warrant, that a felony was 
committed, that he doth suspect or know J.S. to be the felon; and if suspected, 
then to set down the causes of his suspicion.”68 Because “convenient” meant 
“proper,” “congruent,” or “in conformance with the rule” in historical usage,69 
Hale’s statement connoted that the formality of recording the grounds of 
suspicion should be observed unless the need for an immediate arrest of a 
suspected felon was too urgent to allow the delay that would involve. 
Notably, Hale’s statements regarding judicial assessment of the sufficiency 
of the grounds for an arrest warrant were widely restated in the framing-era 
justice-of-the-peace manuals,70 and the limited evidence available regarding 
actual practice seems to confirm that a complainant seeking an arrest warrant 
was required to testify under oath to the fact of a crime and the grounds for 
probable cause as to the identity of the culprit prior to issuance of an arrest 
warrant.71 
 
 67. 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 79, 109–10. 
 68. 1 id. at 582. Common-law authorities often inserted initials (for example, “J.S.”) in the 
quotation in the accompanying text to indicate the need to name a specific person. 
Hale intended flexibility only with regard to the “set[ting] down” (writing up) of the complaint, but not 
the judicial assessment of the cause, because he also wrote, in the second volume of his treatise, 
But that I may say it once for all, it is fit in all cases of warrants for arresting for felony, much 
more for suspicion of felony, to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well 
whether a felony were done, as also the causes of his suspicion, for [the justice] is in this case a 
competent judge of those circumstances, that may induce granting of a warrant to arrest. 
2 id. at 110. 
 69. See 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 861 (2d ed. 1989) (including among definitions for 
“convenient” the obsolete definitions “[a]ccordant, congruous, consonant (to),” “[s]uitable to the 
conditions or circumstances; befitting the case; appropriate, proper, due,” and “[m]orally or ethically 
suitable or becoming; proper”). 
 70. See, e.g., 4 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 18, at 329 (citations to Hale’s treatise omitted): 
It is convenient, though not always necessary, that the party who demands the warrant be first 
examined on oath, touching the whole matter whereupon the warrant is demanded, and that 
examination put into writing . . . . 
Lord Hale proves at large . . . that a justice hath power to issue a warrant to apprehend a 
person suspected of felony, before he is indicted; and that though the original suspicion be not 
in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant. 
For the justices are judges of the reasonableness of the suspicion, and when they have 
examined the party accusing touching the reasons of his suspicion, if they find the causes of 
suspicion to be reasonable, it is now become the justice’s suspicion as well as theirs. 
See also GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 18, at 372 (same language); CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 441–42 (same language). 
 71. Although evidence of actual practice is scarce, at least one incident from the aftermath of the 
framing era indicates that a complainant’s grounds of suspicion were expected to be fully aired prior to 
the issuance of an arrest warrant. During arguments in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), 
Chief Justice Marshall asked Attorney General Caesar Rodney if there would not have been an 
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Serjeant Hawkins stated essentially the same standard for issuing arrest 
warrants as Hale when he published his leading criminal-procedure treatise in 
1721. Specifically, Hawkins wrote that a justice of the peace could justify issuing 
an arrest warrant “upon strong Grounds of Suspicion for a Felony or other 
Misdemeanor.”72 Notably, Hawkins also made one of the earliest attempts to 
define “probable cause of suspicion” as to the identity of the criminal when he 
wrote that a justice of the peace “cannot well be too tender in his Proceedings” 
involving arrest warrants, and could be punished “if he grant any such Warrant 
groundlessly and maliciously, without such a probable Cause, as might induce a 
candid and impartial Man to suspect the Party to be guilty.”73 Hawkins’ “candid 
and impartial man” formulation—which was repeated in the colonial 
manuals74—would shape judicial discussions of criminal probable cause for 
roughly the next two and a half centuries (though Hawkins’ “induce . . . to 
suspect the party to be guilty” would later be elevated to “induce . . . to believe 
the party to be guilty”).75 
2. The Indemnity Provided by a Criminal Arrest Warrant 
Hawkins also identified the situations in which an issued warrant did or did 
not indemnify the constable who executed it. Specifically, he wrote that a 
constable could not justify executing an unparticularized general arrest warrant 
for unidentified persons76 or a warrant for an offense outside of the issuing 
justice’s jurisdiction,77 but that otherwise a constable could justify an arrest by 
warrant “whether any Felony were in Truth committed or not,” because it was 
appropriate that the issuing justice alone should be answerable for issuing a 
warrant in the absence of an actual crime.78 Moreover, because the constable 
had no authority to question the judgment of a magistrate, Hawkins also 
indicated that the warrant need not restate the grounds for suspecting the 
arrestee.79 
 
opportunity for a defendant to cross-examine his accusers during a post-arrest felony committal 
proceeding. Rodney replied that a defendant would not necessarily have had that opportunity because 
the court could use, in place of a further examination of the complainant’s factual allegations, the 
complainant’s ex parte affidavit from the earlier proceeding at which the arrest warrant had been 
issued. Id. at 124. The Attorney General of the United States apparently thought there would be a 
record of the factual allegations upon which an arrest warrant had been issued. 
 72. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 84. Note that Hawkins’ reference to a warrant “for a Felony or 
Misdemeanor” was shorthand for the crime-in-fact requirement. 
 73. 2 id. at 84–85. 
 74. See, e.g., 4 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 330; GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 18, 
at 373; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 442; BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT, OR THE AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 418–19 (Eliphalet Ladd ed., Dover, N.H., 2d ed. 1792). 
 75. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 76. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 81–82. 
 77. Id. at 81. 
 78. Id. at 82. 
 79. Because a warrant was a command from a justice of the peace to a constable, and the constable 
had no authority to question the validity of the command in a particularized warrant, the warrant itself 
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Oddly, the framing-era authorities said little about the personal liability of 
the complainant who sought an arrest warrant in the case in which the arrestee 
was not convicted of the crime. The reason seems to be that it would have been 
difficult, as a practical matter, for an innocent arrestee to have won damages 
from the complainant when an arrest had been made by warrant, because they 
would have had to bring an action for malicious prosecution rather than false 
imprisonment, and—in Blackstone’s words—“any probable cause . . . is 
sufficient to justify the [complainant]” in an action for malicious prosecution.80 
The difficulty facing the plaintiff–arrestee, of course, would have been that a 
justice of the peace had already endorsed the existence of probable cause for 
the arrest when he issued the arrest warrant. 
E. Criminal Search Warrants for Stolen Goods 
The only kind of criminal search that is discussed in the framing-era 
authorities, and sometimes only in passing,81 is a search warrant for stolen 
property. It appears that this warrant had a narrower application than one 
might expect. 
As noted above, the common-law authorities said virtually nothing about 
warrantless searches. The explanation for that silence seems to be partly that 
there was not much to search for (other than stolen property), and partly that it 
was assumed that an arrestee would routinely be searched for weapons or 
stolen goods whenever an arrest was made.82 There may have been a similar 
linkage when an arrest for theft was made by warrant in a house: once the 
warrant authorized entering the house, a search of the house may have been a 
routine part of the arrest that was made there, at least if the arrest was for theft. 
Coke’s interpretation of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision 
supported the general understanding that a felony warrant was usually 
necessary to justify “breaking” a house to make an arrest.83 But because the 
emphasis seems to have been on the need to justify the “breaking” and entry of 
 
did not recite the grounds for suspecting the arrestee to be the felon. See 2 id. at 85 (stating that “it 
seems to be rather discretionary, than necessary to set [the grounds for suspecting] forth in any case”). 
 80. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 126–27. Blackstone’s discussion of the action for malicious 
prosecution was very brief and appears to have been somewhat merged with his discussion of “an 
action for conspiracy”—an action for malicious prosecution against two defendants who allegedly had 
acted in concert in causing the false prosecution of the arrestee–plaintiff. See id. Blackstone commented 
with regard to the action for conspiracy that a plaintiff would be required to produce a court record of 
his indictment and acquittal, but that “in prosecutions for felony” it was usual for the courts to deny the 
needed copy “where there is any, the least, probable cause to found such prosecution upon.” Id. 
Otherwise prosecutors “who had a tolerable ground of suspicion” would be inhibited from prosecuting. 
Id. It seems plausible that this attitude generally applied in malicious prosecution cases. 
 81. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 81–82, 84 (mentioning search warrants for stolen goods 
only in the context of condemning unparticularized general warrants). 
 82. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Coke’s view of the need for a felony 
warrant to justify entering a house). 
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the house,84 it is possible that a felony arrest warrant for theft might have also 
been understood to implicitly authorize a search for the stolen goods in the 
house in which the arrest was made. Oddly, although such searches must have 
occurred, the published authorities do not seem to have discussed this point.85 
Notably, the discussions of search warrants in the common-law authorities 
were only about the “search warrant for stolen goods” and seem to have been 
directed to a setting in which an arrest warrant for theft clearly could not have 
been used, namely, where the stolen property was believed to be in the 
possession of someone not named as the thief—that is, either someone other 
than the thief or someone whom the complainant lacked grounds to accuse of 
being the thief. Indeed, the warrant forms for a search warrant for stolen 
property set out in framing-era manuals recited that the felonious theft had 
been committed “by some person or persons unknown,” but that there was 
probable cause as to the location of the stolen goods.86 Of course, in that 
situation there would not have been any basis for issuance of an arrest warrant. 
Instead, it appears that justices of the peace began to issue search warrants for 
stolen property as a way of permitting the victims of thefts to search houses 
where there were grounds to believe the stolen property was located.87 This may 
 
 84. Like Coke, the framing-era authorities discussed the need for a criminal warrant only with 
regard to “houses,” but not with regard to other premises, carriages, or elsewhere. However, there was 
some ambiguity as to the meaning of “house,” which was sometimes used as simply a synonym for 
“building” during the eighteenth century. For example, John Adams’ 1789 Massachusetts warrant 
provision referred to a subject’s “houses” in the plural. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 115 
n.362. 
 85. The only suggestion that has been identified in framing-era sources for the proposition that an 
arrest warrant would not also justify the search of a house is a 1763 letter by Charles Pratt. See Davies, 
Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 647 n.277 (describing Pratt’s views on search warrants). Pratt was the 
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and the judge in famous Wilkesite cases; he became Lord 
Camden during the course of those cases. See id. at 563 n.21 (describing Pratt’s role in the Wilkesite 
cases). But there does not seem to be any evidence that Pratt’s view was widely shared, or even widely 
known. 
 86. The forms for a search warrant for stolen property in framing-era justice manuals typically 
recited an allegation that specifically identified property had recently “by some person or persons 
unknown, been feloniously taken,” and that there was probable cause as to where the goods were 
located. See, e.g., GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 18, at 324 (form of a search warrant); 
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 384 (same). This same language still appeared at least as 
late as the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 244–45 (1824). Although Dane 
used the heading of “search warrant,” he discussed only the search warrant for stolen goods. Id. 
 87. In 1765, Lord Camden described the issuance of search warrants for stolen property as a 
practice that had “crept into the law by imperceptible practice.” Entick v. Carrington, 11 State Trials 
(Francis Hargrave ed.) 313, 321, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (C.P. 1765). Camden’s discussion in Entick 
was also paraphrased in 1787 in LEACH’S HAWKINS: 
His Lordship said, that warrants to search for stolen goods had crept into the law by 
imperceptible practice, that it is the only case of the kind to be met with, and that the law 
proceeds with great caution. For first, There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft 
committed. 2dly, The owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place. 3rdly, He 
must attend at the execution of the warrant to shew them to the officer, who must see that 
they answer the description. And lastly, the owner must abide the event at his peril; for if the 
goods are not found, He is a trespasser; and the officer being an innocent person will be 
always a ready and convenient witness against him. 
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have meant, however, that a search warrant for stolen property was viewed as 
involving primarily the property owner’s personal interest in retrieving his 
property, rather than the public interest in identifying and punishing thieves. 
Moreover, because the warrant was aimed at the premises of a person who was 
not accused of crime, its use called for greater restraint than the typical felony 
arrest warrant. 
1. The Standard for Issuing a Search Warrant for Stolen Property 
The common-law authorities condemned “general warrants” to search “any 
place” suspected for stolen goods long before the famous prerevolutionary, 
colonial controversies over the use of general warrants for customs searches.88 
These authorities also consistently stated essentially the same two-prong 
standard for issuance of a search warrant for stolen property as that required to 
justify a criminal arrest warrant: a search warrant for stolen property could be 
issued “in case of a complaint, and oath made, of goods stolen [the felony-in-
fact prong], and that the party suspects the goods are in such a house, and shews 
the cause of his suspicion [the probable-cause-of-suspicion prong].”89 As in the 
case of an arrest warrant, issuance of a search warrant for stolen goods was 
characterized as a “judicial act” and thus required the magistrate’s 
“examination of the fact.”90 But in contrast to felony arrest warrants, the 
authorities made no allowance for shortcutting the formality of the procedure 
for issuing a search warrant.91 Although a search warrant for stolen goods was 
directed to a constable, the complainant (the owner of the allegedly stolen 
property) was expected to attend the search to identify the stolen goods.92 
 
2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 135 n.6. 
 88. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 82, 84; 1 HALE, supra note 15, at 580; 2 HALE, supra 
note 15, at 112, 150; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 382–83. 
 89. See, e.g., CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 383. This formulation tracked the one 
given by Hale: That search warrants for stolen goods “are not to be granted without oath made before 
the justice of a felony committed, and that the party complaining hath probable cause to suspect [the 
stolen goods] are in such a house or place, and do shew his reasons of such suspicion.” 2 HALE, supra 
note 15, at 150. Although Hawkins did not state the standard for issuing a search warrant for stolen 
property, beyond noting that it could not take the form of a general warrant, Thomas Leach added a 
discussion of search warrants for stolen goods (based on Lord Camden’s statements in a recent case) in 
his 1787 edition of Hawkins’ treatise. See supra note 87. 
 90. 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 150 (stating that a search warrant for stolen goods could only be “to 
search in such particular places, where the party assigns before the justice his suspicion and the 
probable cause thereof, for these warrants are judicial acts, and must be granted upon examination of 
the fact”). 
 91. As noted above, the authorities allowed some variation in the procedure for issuing a felony 
arrest warrant if there was an urgent need for an immediate arrest. See supra notes 68–69 and 
accompanying text (noting statements that it was “convenient” but not always necessary for the 
magistrate to record the complainant’s sworn information in writing before issuing a felony arrest 
warrant). 
 92. 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 150. 
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2. The Liability Rule for a Warrant Search for Stolen Goods 
As in the case of an arrest by warrant, an officer who only assisted in 
executing a particularized search warrant for stolen goods was indemnified 
against trespass liability.93 But the complainant who sought the warrant was 
protected against liability for trespass damages only if the goods were found. If 
the property was not found as alleged, the search constituted a trespass and the 
complainant was liable for damages.94 The likely explanation for this strict 
liability rule is that a search warrant for stolen goods served largely the 
complainant’s (the theft victim’s) own private interest. Moreover, it appears 
that if a peace officer acted as the complainant, he would also have been liable 
for an unsuccessful search in that role.95 The probable-cause-of-suspicion prong 
of the search-warrant standard was thus relevant as a criterion only for the 
issuance of the warrant; the lawfulness of the search made under the warrant 
ultimately depended on whether the stolen property was actually found. Hence, 
even more than in the case of an arrest warrant, being the complainant for a 
search warrant for stolen goods was not to be taken lightly. 
F. The Framers’ Attempt to Preserve the Common-Law Arrest Standards in 
“Law of the Land” and “Due Process of Law” Provisions 
The common-law arrest and search standards were absorbed as the law of 
the new American states when they declared their independence in 1776. 
However, the Framers in most of the new states were not content to leave it at 
that. Because Parliament had been the source of the prerevolutionary threats to 
common-law rights, the state Framers undertook to adopt constitutional 
declarations of rights that would prohibit the new state legislatures from 
relaxing the settled common-law standards, including those for arrests and 
searches.96 They did not undertake to restate the standards for criminal arrests 
 
 93. 2 id. at 151 (“[T]he officer is excused . . . because he searcheth by warrant.”). 
 94. 2 id. (“[As to the party that sought the warrant,] the breaking of the door [in execution of the 
search warrant] is in eventu lawful or unlawful, viz. lawful, if the goods are there; unlawful, if not 
there.”). This point was reiterated by Lord Camden in 1765. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 291–
92, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (C.P. 1765) (“[I]f the goods are not found there, [the complainant] is a 
trespasser; the officer in that case is a witness.”). See also 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 135 
n.6 (paraphrasing Camden’s ruling); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 383–84 (quoting 
Hale). The trespass liability of the complainant for an unsuccessful search by warrant was still 
recognized in early nineteenth-century American manuals. See 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 244–45 n.*. 
 95. This was the rule in customs and excise searches, as discussed infra notes 139, 145 and 
accompanying text. In 1824 Nathan Dane included a discussion of a revenue officer’s liability for an 
unsuccessful search under an excise warrant in his discussion of the liability of a complainant for an 
unsuccessful search for stolen property under a criminal search warrant. See 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 
244–46 (“But suspicion does not always excuse the officer, especially when he informs.”). 
 96. The original conception of the declarations and bills of rights differed from the modern 
conception in that the provisions were intended to constrain the power of the legislature, rather than to 
directly regulate the conduct of government officers. During the framing era, the understanding was 
that the common law regulated the officer. Moreover, the officer acted as the government only when he 
acted within the lawful authority of his office; he lost that official character and became merely a 
personal trespasser when he acted unlawfully. When an officer acted unlawfully, he was said to act “in 
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and searches themselves, though, because the common law already did that. 
Instead, they invoked the seemingly settled common-law standards by looking 
back to the earlier Cokean tradition of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” 
protection. In particular, that provision forbade a person being “taken” or 
“imprisoned” except by “the law of the land”—the common law. 
Arrests on the Crown’s orders to enforce taxes of disputed legality had been 
a salient constitutional issue during the reign of Charles I in the early 
seventeenth century, and the House of Commons had responded by adopting 
the Petition of Right in 1628.97 During the debate on the Petition, Sir Edward 
Coke argued that arbitrary arrests ordered by the Crown violated the “law of 
the land” protection set out in chapter twenty-nine of Magna Carta.98 Shortly 
thereafter, Coke also set out the common-law standards for lawful arrests in his 
discourse on the contents of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” chapter in his 
Second Institute—almost certainly the most famous of his writings.99 In that 
discussion Coke also noted that an earlier English statute had used the phrase 
“due processe of law” in place of “the law of the land” as a more-precise label 
for common-law, pretrial, criminal-justice standards, including those for 
warrantless arrest.100 Notably, from Coke’s time to the framing-era, legal 
authorities used the term “due process of law” sparingly, and only as a label for 
the common-law requisites of pretrial criminal procedure.101 Thus, in historical 
 
deceit” of the government. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 255. Thus, there was no basis for 
applying the constitution to unlawful conduct by officers. Rather, the point of the constitutional 
provisions was to prevent the legislature from undermining the protections provided by common law; 
the theory was to preserve the common law and let the common law continue to control the officer. 
The modern understanding that unlawful acts by officers constitute a form of government action did 
not gain acceptance until roughly the beginning of the twentieth century. See Davies, Original Fourth, 
supra note 3, at 660–67 (chronicling the development of the modern doctrine of officer misconduct); see 
also infra note 243. 
 97. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 46–47 (outlining the conflict between 
Parliament and Charles I leading to the Petition of Right). 
 98. Although the “law of the land” chapter of Magna Carta is sometimes identified in modern 
histories as chapter thirty-nine, that chapter was uniformly referred to as chapter twenty-nine in 
framing-era works. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 671 n.332. 
 99. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 43–49, 83–86 (discussing Coke’s writings on the 
subject of Magna Carta). 
 100. See 2 COKE, supra note 14, at 50 (stating that the statute “37 E[dward I]. 3. cap. 8” renders “the 
true sense and exposition of [by the law of the land]” as “due proces[s] of law”). For a discussion of this 
passage, see Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 50–52. 
In historical usage, the term “process” usually referred to a written document that conferred authority 
for a judicial proceeding (for example, a warrant, indictment, or writ). See id. at 81 n.244. However, 
Coke asserted that “process” for arrest was not limited to “warrant in deed” (“deed” connoting a 
written warrant) but also extended to “warrant in law . . . without writ” (the legal authority for 
warrantless arrests recognized at common law). See id. at 53. Under the latter heading, Coke then 
proceeded to set out the common-law standards for warrantless arrests as aspects of “due process of 
law.” See id. at 54–62. Interestingly, Coke did not set out the standards for arrest warrants in that 
chapter, but rather did so in his discussion of the office of the justice of the peace in the fourth volume 
of his Institutes. See 4 COKE, supra note 14, at 176–77. 
 101. For example, Blackstone referred to “due process of law” only twice in the four volumes of his 
Commentaries. Both instances were citations to an early statute that tracked chapter twenty-nine of 
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usage the term “process” in “due process” meant the legal authority to initiate a 
criminal prosecution; it was not a synonym for “procedure” (as we use it today). 
Rather, in framing-era sources, fair court procedure was referred to as “due 
course of law.”102 
Because framing-era Americans still learned law by reading Coke’s works, 
they were conversant with Coke’s then-famous discussion of Magna Carta’s 
“law of the land” provision.103 Additionally, later commentators such as 
Blackstone also called attention to the implications that Magna Carta’s “law of 
the land” chapter held for arrest standards.104 So when the American state 
Framers sought to preserve the somewhat complex common-law standards for 
arrest, they invoked those standards by adopting constitutional prohibitions 
against a person’s being “taken” unless according to “the law of the land.” John 
Adams updated that phrasing when he drafted the 1780 Massachusetts 
Declaration to say that no person was to be “arrested, imprisoned” or punished 
except by “the law of the land.”105 Notably, the Framers of the initial state 
constitutions and declarations of rights included these arrest prohibitions more 
frequently than provisions that banned the use of general warrants.106 
To make the constraint against legislative relaxation of common-law 
standards even clearer, Alexander Hamilton initiated a shift from the “law of 
the land” label to the more-precise terminology, “due process of law,” when 
New York adopted a bill of rights in 1787.107 In keeping with Coke’s treatment, a 
 
Magna Carta by commanding that no person was to be held for a capital trial except by “due process of 
law.” Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 82–83. 
 102. Id. at 81–82. 
 103. Id. at 83–86. 
 104. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 130–31 (“[Englishmen are entitled to] the personal liberty of 
individuals . . . . [T]he language of the great charter [Magna Carta] is, that no freeman shall be taken or 
imprisoned, but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. And many subsequent 
old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned by suggestion of petition to the 
king, or his council, unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law.”). 
 105. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 112–13 (discussing Adams’ role in drafting the 
Declaration). Adams placed this provision prior to a separate provision banning general warrants—the 
provision that first introduced the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures.” See also Davies, 
Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 686–91 (explaining Adams’ choice of the phrase “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” in his ban against general warrants). 
 106. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 93–127 (surveying the initial state constitutional 
provisions relating to arrest and warrant standards). When George Mason produced the initial draft of 
the 1776 Virginia declaration of rights (the first of the state declarations), he included an arrest 
provision “that no Man, except in times of actual Invasion or Insurrection, can be imprisoned upon 
Suspicion of Crimes against the State, unsupported by Legal Evidence.” Davies, Correcting History, 
supra note 3, at 93–94. But Mason declined to include a provision banning general warrants because he 
did not deem that to be sufficiently fundamental. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 674. 
 107. Although the New York Constitution of 1777 had included a “law of the land” guarantee, 
radical elements of the New York legislature later asserted that, because a statute would be part of the 
“laws,” the clause did not prevent them from legislatively disenfranchising former Tories. Hamilton 
denounced this interpretation and quoted Coke to the effect that “law of the land” meant “due process 
of law,” and asserted that the latter term clearly indicated a common-law protection that could not be 
relaxed by legislation. The Hamiltonian faction then succeeded in enacting a 1787 bill of rights that, 
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provision in the New York bill expressly prohibited a person’s being “arrested” 
unless by “due process of law.”108 
James Madison, who was in New York City in 1789, and who had also 
recently collaborated with Hamilton in contributing essays for The Federalist,109 
followed Hamilton’s shift when he authored the first draft for a federal bill of 
rights. Thus, Madison included the “due process of law” protection among the 
other requisites for the initiation of valid criminal prosecutions that he collected 
in the proto–Fifth Amendment.110 Indeed, Madison’s proposed ordering for the 
criminal-procedure amendments, in which he placed the proto–Fifth 
Amendment first among the criminal-procedure provisions, shows that he 
adhered to the understanding that “due process of law” pertained to the 
requisites for the initiation of criminal proceedings, including arrest and 
indictment. Next in Madison’s ordering came the proto–Eighth Amendment’s 
ban against excessive bail, then the proto–Fourth Amendment’s ban against use 
of general warrants, and finally the proto–Sixth Amendment’s statement of 
criminal-trial rights.111 
Because the federal Congress was understood to possess only enumerated 
powers, rather than the plenary power of the state legislatures, it is unlikely that 
the federal Framers anticipated that the federal government would engage in 
general criminal-law enforcement. Hence, it is quite possible that they were less 
concerned with general criminal-justice protections than the state Framers had 
been. Even so, there is no reason to think the federal Framers meant to adopt 
any novel understanding of “due process of law” when they framed the Fifth 
Amendment in 1789.112 (Our current conceptions of procedural and substantive 
“due process” are almost entirely the products of late-nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Supreme Court innovations, but that is another story.)113 
 
among other provisions, specifically barred arrests except according to “due process of law.” Davies, 
Correcting History, supra note 3, at 121–27. 
 108. Id. at 124. 
 109. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), NO.23 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 110. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 144–51 (explaining how the provisions in 
Madison’s proto–Fifth Amendment were not miscellaneous but all related to the requisites for the 
initiation of a valid criminal prosecution). 
 111. Id. at 140–42. The amendments were debated in the order in which Madison proposed them. 
No record exists to explain why a final committee on style reordered the amendments to the final 
order. Id. at 169–71. 
 112. See id. at 155–58 (discussing the Framers’ understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s language). 
 113. See id. at 197–200 (noting that the Supreme Court turned its back on the original criminal-
procedure content of “due process of law” in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and then 
redefined the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to serve its campaign to protect 
businesses from regulation by state governments). 
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III 
THE ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD FOR REVENUE 
SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
What, then, was the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment? 
Indeed, given that bare probable cause—that is, probable cause regarding 
whether a crime was committed—was insufficient to justify issuance of a 
criminal warrant, why did the Framers of the Fourth Amendment simply 
identify “probable cause” as the minimum standard for issuance of 
constitutional warrants? The most plausible answer is that the Fourth 
Amendment was actually a focused response to controversies regarding the 
legality of the use of general warrants for revenue searches of houses, and the 
one area of law where bare probable cause had emerged as the accepted 
standard by the framing era was for revenue search warrants. 
A. The Prerevolutionary General-Warrant Grievance 
The conventional history of the Fourth Amendment is correct insofar as it 
locates the impetus for the American constitutional provisions that set 
minimum standards for the issuance of warrants in prerevolutionary 
controversies regarding the legality of general warrants. There had been two 
distinct lines of general-warrant controversies. In one, which involved the 
English Wilksite cases of the early 1760s, the Secretary of State had issued 
general warrants ordering officers to search the houses of political opponents to 
discover any papers constituting evidence of seditious libel. In subsequent 
lawsuits for damages brought by John Wilkes and other victims of the searches, 
the English courts ruled that the general warrants were illegal and the searches 
were trespasses.114 
In the other line of controversies, which was the more direct basis for the 
American colonial grievance against general warrants, Parliament had 
authorized commissioned customs officers to use a “writ of assistance” as 
authority to conduct customs searches of houses in the American colonies. As 
used in the American colonies, this writ was an extreme form of 
unparticularized, and thus “general” warrant. The term “general warrant” 
usually referred to a warrant that authorized a search for specific fugitives or 
specific stolen goods, but left to the judgment of the officer what places or 
houses to search. In contrast, a writ of assistance was issued to a customs officer 
when he was appointed, and it provided him with continuous authority to 
search any place or house for any kind of smuggled or prohibited goods.115 
There were two episodes of controversy regarding the customs writ of 
assistance in America. In the first, which arose in Boston in 1761, James Otis 
 
 114. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 562–65. 
 115. The writ of assistance may have been used in a more limited way for customs searches in 
England, but it is unclear whether Americans were familiar with that usage during the American 
controversies. See infra notes 138–39. 
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argued in the Writs of Assistance Case that the use of such writs was contrary to 
fundamental principles of law and especially the “Privilege of House.”116 The 
colonial supreme court, however, upheld the legality of the writ.117 The second, 
more widespread, and more important episode arose when Parliament 
reauthorized the use of the general writ of assistance for customs enforcement 
in the American colonies in the 1767 Townshend Duties Act—after the English 
courts had condemned the illegality of general warrants in the Wilkesite cases. 
Despite the new statutory authority, colonists challenged the legality of the 
general writ in a number of the colonial courts, and some of the judges refused 
to issue such writs on the ground that they were “discretionary” or 
“unconstitutional,” while others simply did not act on requests for issuance of 
the writs.118 Hence, with the possible exception of Massachusetts (where the 
1761 Writs of Assistance Case was precedent for the legality of the writ), it 
appears that few searches under such writs were actually conducted. Perhaps for 
that reason, the colonial general-warrant grievance had been displaced by even 
more onerous grievances by the time of the Declaration of Independence. 
Nevertheless, the memory of the colonial grievance still prompted the Framers 
in a number of the new states to include a ban against issuance of 
unparticularized general warrants among the provisions of the state 
declarations of rights adopted between 1776 and 1784.119 
Unsurprisingly, all of the early state provisions that addressed warrants 
required that they be particularized—that is, that they identify the place(s) to 
be searched and the person(s) to be arrested or thing(s) to be seized. But the 
early state provisions were not uniform with regard to the appropriate standard 
for assessing the justification for a search or arrest warrant. The initial warrant 
provision adopted by Virginia in 1776 comported with common-law criminal-
warrant standards by requiring “evidence of a fact committed,” and North 
Carolina followed suit.120 The cause standards set out in later state provisions, 
though, were not as specific. Maryland and Delaware required merely an “oath 
or affirmation” without specifically saying what such testimony had to show.121 
Pennsylvania required “oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient 
foundation for [the warrant],”122 and John Adams’ Massachusetts provision 
called for “the cause or foundation” for a warrant to “be . . . previously 
 
 116. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 643 (reciting John Adams’ notes of Otis’ argument 
during the Writs of Assistance Case); see also id. at 642–46. 
 117. Id. at 561, 689–91. For an extensive treatment, see M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 
CASE (1978). 
 118. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 566–67. 
 119. See id. at 674–86 (setting out the state warrant provisions that preceded the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment); see also Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 89–125 (discussing the 
inclusion of law of the land or due process of law provisions and warrant provisions in the state 
constitutions or declarations of rights that preceded the adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights). 
 120. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 100 (Virginia); id. at 103 n.319 (North Carolina). 
 121. Id. at 102 (Maryland); id. at 108 n.340 (Delaware). 
 122. Id. at 106. 
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supported by oath or affirmation.”123 Notably, however, none of the state 
declarations used “probable cause,” and that was also the case with the 
proposals for a federal ban against general warrants made by several of the 
state ratifying conventions in 1787 and 1788.124 
Why this lack of specificity in the later provisions? The most likely 
explanation is that the Framers in the states that had substantial port cities 
(which included Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, but not Virginia or North 
Carolina)125—and who thus would have been most concerned with facilitating 
customs collections—had grasped the need to leave sufficient room for the 
issuance of customs search warrants. Indeed, the need to allow room for 
customs searches may also explain why the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts 
warrant provisions also included statements that defined the scope of the 
protection against general warrants in terms of persons, houses, papers, and 
possessions126—a formulation that is noteworthy for its implicit exclusion of 
ships, and, possibly, even warehouses.127 
Revenue searches differed from criminal searches in two important respects. 
First, because revenue was essential to the survival of the government, and thus 
an essential public good, revenue searches likely were regarded as being more 
 
 123. Id. at 114–15. 
 124. See id. at 131–36 (noting, for example, that Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists called for a ban 
against “warrants unsupported by evidence”; that Virginia called for a ban against warrants “lacking 
legal and sufficient cause”; and that New York called for a ban against warrants “without information 
upon Oath or Affirmation of sufficient cause”). 
 125. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 681, n.369 (noting the importance of Philadelphia and 
Boston as ports of entry for goods from Britain and Europe). 
 126. See id. at 677 (Pennsylvania warrant provision); id. at 684 (Massachusetts warrant provision). 
 127. Id. at 679–83. This formulation of the scope of the right was in keeping with the usual 
understanding that dwelling houses enjoyed special protection at common law, but that ships did not. 
Id. at 605–08. In the years immediately following the adoption of their state bans against general 
warrants, both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts enacted revenue search statutes that required warrants 
for searches of dwelling houses but that allowed warrantless searches of commercial premises. 
For example, section 10 of a 1780 Pennsylvania impost (customs) statute provided that customs officers 
had “full power and authority . . . to enter any ship or vessel, and into any house or other place where 
he shall have reason to suspect [uncustomed goods] shall be concealed, and therein to search for the 
same” and also provided that “in case of refusal or opposition” the customs officer could obtain a “writ 
of assistance” to break doors. However, under a proviso in the next section “no search of any dwelling 
shall be made in the manner aforesaid, until due cause of suspicion hath been shewn to the satisfaction 
of a [magistrate], as in the case of stolen goods.” (The standard for a search warrant for stolen goods is 
discussed supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.) See Act for Impost on Goods, Wares and 
Merchandize imported into this State, §§ 10, 11, December 23, 1780. 
A similar treatment appears in a 1783 Massachusetts “excise” statute which provided that when an 
informer gave sworn written information to a customs collector of “just cause to suspect” that goods 
had been improperly imported the officer was “authorized to enter . . . into the vessel or float, store, 
building or place (dwelling houses excepted) and there search for the said goods” but that when an 
informer had “just cause to suspect” that goods had been “put into any dwelling house” he could “give 
satisfactory information thereof on oath, to a [magistrate who] may, and is hereby authorized to issue 
his warrant . . . to enter such dwelling house, and there search for the said goods.” Act laying Duties of 
Impost and Excise on certain Goods, Wares and Merchandize therein described, and for repealing the 
several Laws heretofore made for that Purpose, July, 10, 1783. See also Davies, Original Fourth, supra 
note 3, at 681 n.370; id. at 682 n.372; id. at 683. 
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important than criminal searches, especially when the object of the latter was 
primarily the recovery of stolen property by the individual owner.128 Second, 
revenue enforcement could not rely upon victim complaints to initiate 
prosecutions, as criminal justice did. Rather, revenue enforcement necessarily 
depended on officers discovering violations through their own initiative (which 
they were motivated to exercise by the promise of a share of the seized and 
forfeited goods).129 Thus, the common-law criminal requirement of an 
accusation of crime committed “in fact” was too restrictive for revenue 
searches. Instead, the now-independent Americans looked back to English 
revenue law for revenue search-warrant standards, and that seems to have been 
the unique setting in which bare probable cause to suspect a violation had 
emerged as the accepted legal standard. 
B. The Emergence of Bare Probable Cause to Suspect as the English Standard 
for Revenue Search Warrants 
The concept of reasonable or probable cause was used in two quite different 
ways in eighteenth-century English revenue statutes. The earliest use seems to 
have been as a standard for a magistrate to issue a revenue search warrant to 
locate untaxed goods. In that setting, “reasonable cause” referred to the 
sufficiency of the factual grounds for suspecting that a revenue violation had 
occurred.130 The other use, which appeared a little later, was that English 
customs statutes empowered judges to issue a “certificate of probable cause” to 
immunize a customs officer against damage lawsuits if the officer had made a 
seizure of goods that was determined to be invalid during the subsequent 
condemnation proceeding.131 Although both uses might appear to involve the 
 
 128. Jeremiah Gridley argued as much in the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case in Boston. See John 
Adams, John Adams’s “Abstract,” reprinted in SMITH, supra note 117, at 548–50 (reciting that Gridley 
asked rhetorically if the collection of “the Revenue” to support the army and navy were not “infinitely 
more important than the imprisonment of Thieves, or even Murderers?”). Lord Mansfield made a 
similar statement in 1785. See Cooper v. Boot, 4 Doug. 339, 349, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916 (K.B. 1785) 
(quoting Mansfield as asserting that a revenue search warrant should be more readily available to a 
revenue officer than a search warrant for stolen goods should be to a private complainant because the 
former was “for the benefit of the public, and it is for their benefit that the parties may proceed safely 
on reasonable grounds”). Because this case report was not published until 1831, framing-era Americans 
would not have been familiar with Mansfield’s post-Independence statement. Davies, Original Fourth, 
supra note 3, at 561 n.19. 
 129. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 659 n.304 (describing the “office for profit” nature 
of customs positions in colonial America). 
 130. See, e.g., the statutes discussed infra notes 142–44 (authorizing issuance of excise search 
warrants). 
 131. At common law, a revenue officer who seized property found to not be in violation of the 
revenue laws (property that was not condemned and thus not forfeit) was subject to a trespass action 
for damages to be tried by a jury. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 652 n.294. To protect the 
officer, and thus encourage more aggressive revenue enforcement, Parliament made a judicially issued 
certificate of “probable cause” a defense to a trespass suit for an unlawful revenue seizure. See id. at 
653 n.295. This assessment was not made before a seizure (as would have been the case in assessing 
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant), but afterwards, when the legality of the seizure had 
been adjudicated and found invalid. Issuance of such a certificate had the effect of barring what 
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same conception of “probable cause” and thus to have both contributed to the 
inclusion of bare probable cause in the Fourth Amendment,132 that was not the 
case. A certificate of probable cause immunized a customs officer for an 
improper seizure of property133 and could be issued when the officer was judged 
to have acted from an excusable mistake as to the legal interpretation of the 
customs regulations.134 It does not appear, however, that a certificate of 
probable cause could have been issued to protect a customs officer from a 
trespass lawsuit for unlawfully searching for untaxed goods.135 So the certificate 
of probable cause does not appear to be an aspect of the story of arrest or 
search authority.136 Instead, the English statutory standards for issuance of 
 
otherwise would have been a situation for a jury to assess liability and damages in the trial of the 
property owner’s lawsuit. 
Parliament also authorized the vice-admiralty judges in the North American colonies to grant a 
certificate of probable cause as a defense against trespass suits for wrongful seizures in the 1764 Sugar 
Act, a provision that prompted significant colonial protests of this displacement of the traditional role 
of the jury. Because that certificate provision was also made applicable to other revenue seizures in the 
American colonies, it was also understood to apply to seizures for violations of other revenue statutes, 
including the hated 1765 Stamp Act. See also infra note 135. 
 132. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 652–53, 703 n.446 (describing the different uses of 
“probable cause” in historical statutes). 
 133. For example, the first federal customs statute, the 1789 Collections Act, provided for issuance 
of a certificate of probable cause at the end of a customs condemnation procedure if the seizure was 
ruled invalid but “it . . . appear[s] to the court before whom such [condemnation proceeding] shall be 
tried, that there was a reasonable cause of seizure.” See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47–
48. 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Riddle, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 311, 312–13 (1809) (holding that a customs 
seizure of goods was invalid, “[b]ut as the construction of the law was liable to some question,” issuance 
of a certificate of probable cause was proper). Along the same lines, the customs controversies that 
preceded the American Revolution in which certificates of probable cause were issued, such as those 
regarding the seizures of ships belonging to the Charleston merchant Henry Laurens, involved 
hypertechnical interpretations of customs regulations rather than factual issues or searches for untaxed 
goods. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 604–05. 
Additionally, the term “probable cause” was sometimes used by framing-era legal authorities in 
settings that involved only legal assessments, but not factual assessments. For example, Blackstone 
wrote that the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus did not issue “without 
shewing some probable cause” why the issuance was appropriate. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 
132. The reference to the writ of mandamus is significant because only legal, but not factual, issues 
could be raised in mandamus proceedings. See id. at 111 (noting that if any factual disputes arose in 
mandamus pleadings, the mandamus proceeding was ended and the petitioner had to instead file an 
action for damages for filing a false return, to be tried by a jury). 
 135. For example, there is no mention of a certificate of probable cause in English cases regarding 
the trespass liability of a revenue officer who conducted an unsuccessful search for untaxed goods. See 
infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. Likewise, the certificate of probable cause provided for in 
the 1789 Collections Act was specifically for “reasonable cause of seizure,” but made no mention of a 
search. See supra note 133. 
 136. There were colonial controversies regarding the provisions for a certificate of probable cause in 
revenue statutes that applied to the colonies. For example, in 1766, George Mason (who would later 
draft the 1776 Virginia declaration of rights) attacked a statutory authorization for a vice-admiralty 
judge to issue a certificate of probable cause, and thus bar a jury trespass trial, in a letter to British 
merchants. Mason wrote that it was outrageous to give a judge who was a mere puppet of the customs 
ministry the power to arbitrarily immunize an unlawful seizure by a revenue officer “by only certifying 
that in [the judge’s] Opinion there was a probable Cause of Complaint.” Letter from George Mason to 
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revenue search warrants are the salient source of the bare-probable-cause 
warrant standard in the Fourth Amendment. 
1. English Customs Search Authority 
English revenue law set different standards for customs searches and excise 
searches. Customs duties were collected when goods were brought into England 
across its border, usually by ship. Probably because of the strong governmental 
authority to enforce the border, and because ships were not entitled to any 
privileged treatment at common law, English statutes simply gave “deput[ized]” 
customs officers standing authority to search ships entering English waters 
without requiring that they show, or even possess, grounds to suspect 
smuggling.137 Additionally, English customs statutes authorized customs officers 
to make searches of places on land with a writ of assistance.138 The principal 
check on the use of this form of search authority was that a customs officer who 
initiated a search under a writ on his own initiative, rather than on information 
from another person, was himself potentially liable for trespass damages to the 
owner of the premises if he did not find smuggled or prohibited goods.139 
2. English Excise Search Warrants 
In contrast to customs collections, which were concentrated in port cities, 
English excise taxes were imposed on the production, sale, or consumption of a 
wide variety of widely used goods and products throughout the country 
 
the Committee of Merchants of London (June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 65, 
67 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970). 
 137. See, e.g., 2 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 8 (paraphrasing 9 Geo. 2. c. 35. § 29 (1722): “Any 
officer of the customs or excise (producing his warrant or deputation, if required) may go on board any 
coasting vessel, and search for prohibited and uncustomed goods, and continue on board during the 
vessel’s stay within the limits of the port . . . .”); id. (1785 ed.) at 7 (same). Because search warrants 
were not provided for in English statutes of this period, it seems likely that the term “warrant” in this 
passage simply meant the officer’s “authority”; for example, modern English police refer to their 
identification as a “warrant card.” 
 138. Parliament conferred customs revenues on the crown at the Restoration in 1660, and shortly 
thereafter created a customs search warrant. See An Act to Prevent Frauds and Concealments of his 
Majesty’s Customs, 1660, 12 Car. 2, ch. 19. That search warrant provision was replaced with the writ of 
assistance two years later. See An Act to Prevent Frauds, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2., ch. 11, § 5, sched. 2); see 
also SMITH, supra note 117, at 41–50. The entry on “power to search” in the discussion of customs in 
the 1770 and 1785 editions of Burn’s justice of the peace manual mentions the “writ of assistance out of 
the exchequer.” 2 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 6; 2 id. (1785 ed.) at 5. 
There is evidence that searches conducted by revenue officers under a writ of assistance in England, 
unlike in the North American colonies, were often based, in practice, on information regarding a 
specific violation, though it does not appear that colonial Americans were aware of this during the 
colonial controversies. See SMITH, supra note 117, at 511–15 (providing an account of American 
confusion over the writs from contemporary letters). 
 139. See, e.g., Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wils. 61, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P. 1770) (imposing trespass liability 
on a customs officer who, pursuant to a writ of assistance, made an unsuccessful search on his own 
initiative rather than on information from another person). Framing-era Americans likely were familiar 
with Bruce because it was first published in 1775. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 652 n.294. 
Note, however, that this decision post-dated the American colonial controversies of the 1760s regarding 
the use of the writ of assistance for customs searches. 
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(including, for example, liquor, beer, ale, cider, coffee, tea, salt, soap, sugar, 
vinegar, linen, candles, and starch). Because these taxes often applied to small 
producers, excise enforcement exposed houses to revenue searches to a far 
greater degree than customs searches did. Perhaps for that reason, the statutory 
standards for excise searches distinguished between commercial premises and 
houses. The statutes often provided that commercial premises where taxed 
products were made or sold were to be “ent[e]red” (registered) at the local 
excise office and that excise officers could search those commercial premises 
without warrant.140 In contrast, and in keeping with the special status accorded 
the house, the statutes provided for issuance of excise search warrants for 
searches in other places such as houses.141 
Additionally, the statutory standards for issuing excise search warrants seem 
to have become more stringent during the early eighteenth century. An excise 
statute regarding various cloths, enacted in 1711, authorized the issuance of a 
search warrant on an oath by a credible informer that he had reason to suspect 
that untaxed cloth was concealed; but this statute did not explicitly require 
either that the informer set out the grounds of suspicion or that the magistrate 
assess the sufficiency of those grounds before issuing the warrant.142 However, 
beginning with the reign of George I, statutory excise-search-warrant provisions 
required that the officer state under oath the grounds for suspecting the 
location of concealed goods, and also provided that a magistrate was authorized 
to issue a “special” (specific) search warrant if the magistrate “shall judge it 
reasonable.”143 Thus these statutes seem to have called for the magistrate to 
assess the officer’s showing of reasonable cause before granting a warrant. 
 
 140. See, e.g., 2 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 34 (stating that with regard to ale or beer, any 
brewer had to give notice (register) with the local excise office and that an officer of excise was 
empowered to break the door of any brewhouse “where he shall have just suspicion” that the excise 
was being violated by illegal production). 
 141. For example, in 1763 William Pitt was decrying the danger that excise officers would enter 
private residences and violate the sanctity of the house to levy the tax on cider when he famously 
declared in Parliament that “[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the 
Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the 
rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of that 
ruined tenement.” Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378–79 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 15 
HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1753–1765 1307). 
 142. An excise statute pertaining to silk, linen, and other fabrics that was enacted during the reign of 
Queen Anne, simply provided that justices “may” issue a search warrant on an oath by a credible 
person that “he, she, or they have reason to suspect or believe” the whereabouts of untaxed goods, but 
did not explicitly require either that the person state the grounds of suspicion, or that the magistrate 
assess the sufficiency of the grounds. An Act for Laying Several Duties Upon All Sope and Paper, 10 
Ann., c. 19, § 98 (1711). 
 143. For example, the search warrant provision in the 1765 excise statute for candles stated the 
following: 
[I]n case any Officer . . . shall have cause to suspect that Soap or Candles . . . are privately 
making in any place . . . or that any Soap or Candles . . . are lodged or concealed . . . with 
Intent to defraud his Majesty of his Duty; then . . . upon oath made by such Officer before the 
Commissioners [of excise] . . . or before one or more Justice [of the peace] . . . setting forth the 
Ground of his [suspicion] . . . it shall and may be lawful for said Commissioner or . . . Justice . . 
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3. The English Liability Rule Regarding Unsuccessful Revenue Searches 
The English rule at the time of American independence (when English 
common law was absorbed into American law) was that an excise search 
warrant did not automatically indemnify an excise officer for an unsuccessful 
search. Rather, in the 1773 Court of Common Pleas ruling in Bostock v. 
Saunders,144 the judges equated the statutory standard of “reasonable cause” 
with “probable cause” and ruled that an officer who obtained a search warrant 
on his own initiative was liable for trespass damages of £100 when he made an 
unsuccessful search of a house for untaxed goods, and did not show “probable 
cause or ground of suspicion” for the search to the satisfaction of the jury in the 
subsequent trespass action.145 William Blackstone, who was among the judges, 
 
. if he or they shall judge it reasonable, by Special Warrant . . . to authorize and empower such 
Officer . . . to enter into all and every such Place [suspected] . . . and to seize and carry away 
all such Soap or Candles . . . 
Customs and Exise Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 43, § 20 (1765) (emphasis added). Similar provisions stating an 
explicit requirement that the grounds of suspicion be set out, and that the magistrate find the grounds 
“reasonable” before issuing an excise search warrant appeared in excise statutes as early as the reign of 
George I. See, e.g., 10 Geo. 1, c. 10, § 13 (1723) (coffee, tea, chocolate); 11 Geo. 1, c. 30, § 2 (1724) (rum 
and spirits); 23 Geo. 2, c. 21, § 34 (1750) (soap, candles, and starch). 
 144. There are two reports of the 1773 decision. The earliest was Bostock v. Saunders, 2 Wils. (1st 
ed., Part 3, titled “Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Common Pleas,” 1775), 
reprinted 2 id. (2d ed. 1784) 434, reprinted 3 id. (3rd ed. 1799) 434, 95 Eng. Rep. 1141. Because the 
pagination is consistent in all three editions, I cite only the most readily available third edition in 
subsequent notes. The other report, published in 1781, was by William Blackstone, who was one of the 
judges in the case. Bostock v. Saunders, 2 Bl. 912, 96 Eng. Rep. 539.  Blackstone’s report was also 
paraphrased in some detail in the entry on excise in the 1785 edition of Burn’s manual. See 2 BURN 
(1785 ed.), supra note 17, at 69–71. As a result, Bostock was readily accessible by Americans during the 
framing era. 
 145. Bostock, 3 Wils. (3d ed. 1799) at 440–41, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1144–45 (opinion of Chief Justice de 
Grey). See also id. at 441, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145 (opinion of Justice Gould that the officer could not 
justify under the warrant but, though no goods were found, it might have been justified if he showed “a 
probable cause” for the search); id. at 442, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1146 (opinion of Justice Nares that the 
officer was required to prove “probable cause or ground of suspicion” for the search). However, the 
term “probable cause” does not appear in the report of the judges’ views in the other case report of 
Bostock by Blackstone. See 2 Bl. at 913–16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 539–40. 
There was uncertainty as to whether the commissioners of excise had actually assessed the grounds for 
the excise search warrant, issued under 10 Geo. 1, c. 10, § 13 (1723) (discussed supra note 143). 
Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that the warrant had been issued merely on the officer’s conclusory claim of 
probable cause.  See 3 Wils. at 436, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1142. Perhaps to deflect future claims against the 
commissioners, Chief Justice de Grey asserted that under this statutory provision “the commissioners 
were bound to grant the warrant on oath of [the officer].”  3 id. at 440, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145. In 
contrast, Justices Gould and Blackstone suggested that the commissioners might be liable if they issued 
a warrant without an adequate showing of cause, but declined to actually rule on that point.  3 id. at 
441, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145–46.  Justice Nares stated the commissioners had “a discretionary power to 
grant such a warrant.” 3 id. at 442, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1146. Notwithstanding these differences, the justices 
all agreed that an officer who initiated an excise search warrant was liable for trespass damages if the 
search was unsuccessful and he failed to prove adequate cause to the jury. Chief Justice de Grey 
analogized an officer-informer’s liability to that of the complainant for an unsuccessful search under a 
search warrant for stolen goods.  3 id. at 440, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145. 
Bostock’s liability rule was overruled in 1785 by the Court of King’s Bench, which instead held that an 
excise officer who had failed to find untaxed goods while executing a warrant obtained on his own oath 
was nevertheless protected against trespass liability. See Cooper v. Booth, 3 Esp. 135, 143–46, 170 Eng. 
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gave the opinion that, although “the law reposes a confidence that [magistrates] 
will not wantonly authorize the officers to enter the houses of the subject, . . . 
still, if the suspicion, tho’ plausible, appears to be ill founded; the officer, who, 
by a false and mistaken suggestion, hath obtained such licence from the 
commissioners, shall personally answer for the injury.”146 Apparently, a 
“plausible” suspicion was not enough to justify the unsuccessful warrant search. 
C. The American Adoption of Bare Probable Cause as the Standard for 
Revenue Search Warrants 
The American political elite seem to have viewed revenue collections in a 
new light when the revenues were funding American governments rather than 
that in London, especially because the huge debt incurred during the 
Revolutionary War presented a pressing need to obtain revenue for the new 
national government. However, the need for effective revenue collection was 
counterbalanced by the memory of the colonial general warrant grievance. To 
accommodate both concerns, Americans seem to have looked to the recent 
English excise statutes as a workable compromise—that is, they accepted the 
use of a warrant to authorize a search of a house if, but only if a magistrate 
concluded that an excise officer had shown “reasonable” or “probable cause” of 
an excise violation. 
Although this bare-probable-cause standard was laxer than the common-law 
crime-in-fact standard for a criminal warrant, the magistrate’s assessment 
nevertheless offered far more protection against arbitrary revenue searches 
than the general writ or general warrant had. In particular, a revenue search 
warrant based on a judicial assessment of bare probable cause did not bestow 
discretion on the revenue officer himself—but neither would it stifle revenue 
enforcement the way the crime-in-fact requirement for a criminal warrant 
would have. In addition, a revenue warrant did not immunize the officer who 
obtained it; rather, American law seems to have absorbed the ruling in Bostock 
that a revenue officer who conducted an unsuccessful search under a revenue 
search warrant was liable for trespass damages if he could not show “probable 
cause” for the search to the satisfaction of a jury.147 
 
Rep. 564, 567–68 (K.B. 1785). However, it is highly unlikely that Americans were familiar with Cooper 
when the Fourth Amendment was framed or ratified because this case report was not published prior 
to 1801, Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 561 n.19, and the only other report of the case, 
Cooper v. Booth, 4 Dougl. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785), was not published until 1831. Thus, 
framing-era Americans would have been familiar only with the ruling in Bostock. Indeed, Cooper was 
not even well known in England at the time of the framing of the American Bill of Rights because the 
1797 edition of Burn’s manual still set out the same discussion of Bostock as had appeared in the earlier 
1785 edition, without mentioning Cooper. See 2 BURN (1785 ed.), supra note 17, at 69–71; 2 id. (1797 
ed.) at 91–93. 
 146. Bostock, 2 Bl. at 915–16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 540 (opinion of Blackstone, J.); see also 2 BURN (1785 
ed.), supra note 17, at 71 (paraphrasing opinion of Blackstone, J., as reported in Bostock, 2 Bl. at 915–
16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 540). 
 147. See 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 244–46 (citing the reports of Bostock as authority that “suspicion 
does not always excuse the officer [executing a search warrant], especially when he informs” and that 
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The appeal of this compromise standard for revenue warrants is evident in 
American legislation adopted in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. 
Shortly after the end of the war, there was an attempt to create customs 
revenue for the new national government. In 1786, Pennsylvania enacted a 
statute that accepted the national scheme but with the proviso that its 
acceptance 
shall not be construed . . . to enable any officer or other person to break open any 
dwelling house without probable cause for so doing be shewn on oath, or solemn 
affirmation, to some Justice of the Supreme Court or to some Justice of the Peace, and 
his warrant, directed to a Peace Officer, first obtained.148 
Note that the requirement that probable cause “be shewn on oath” would 
seem to require the officer to set out the factual grounds for probable cause. 
Controversy over revenue searches of houses was reignited during the 
ratification debates of 1787–1788. Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of 
the new constitution frequently warned that the new federal government would 
exact ruinous taxes, and they embellished those alarms by invoking the memory 
of the prerevolutionary general-warrant grievance.149 In particular, they warned 
that the new federal Congress would be so eager to collect taxes—especially 
excise taxes, which would be collected throughout the country—that it would 
authorize the use of general warrants for revenue searches and thereby expose 
every house to invasion by “excisemen.” Notably, the fears about search 
authority expressed in the debates were almost exclusively about revenue 
searches of houses—especially excise searches of houses under general 
warrants.150 
In particular, the agitation regarding the potential for federal general excise 
search warrants does not seem to have extended to criminal arrest or search 
warrants. The two areas of law were quite distinct, and revenue violations 
generally did not result in criminal prosecutions. Instead, the usual sanction for 
a violation of the revenue law was the seizure of the untaxed goods which were 
then declared forfeit in a civil proceeding. Indeed, there were so few 
expressions of concern about the potential for general criminal warrants during 
the 1787 and 1788 debates that it could not have been more than a marginal 
aspect of the agitation that prompted the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.151 
 
“where an excise officer informed and got a search-warrant to search for excised goods in A’s house 
and found none in it[,] [t]he court held, the officer was liable in an action of trespass, and that on the 
trial he must show the grounds of his suspicion,” and that “the same construction ought to be given of 
our [American] impost and excise laws in like cases”). 
 148. Session Laws of Pennsylvania, Act of April 8, 1786, ch. 30, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 149. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 609–10, 721–22. 
 150. Id. at 609–11. 
 151. The two expressions of concern about criminal general warrants that have been identified are a 
statement by Patrick Henry during the Virginia ratification convention and another by Abraham 
Holmes during the Massachusetts convention. See id. at 609 n.162. When Henry lamented the absence 
of a federal ban against general warrants, he expressed a concern that, if a person were to be arrested 
under such a general warrant, it might occur “many hundreds of miles from the judges” and thus it 
would be more cumbersome for the arrested person to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in America than 
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D. The Bare-Probable-Cause Standard in the Fourth Amendment 
To quiet the fears that the new national government would authorize the 
use of general warrants for revenue searches, the First Congress included a ban 
against issuance of general warrants among the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
The narrow focus of the provision that we know as the Fourth Amendment is 
quite evident if one considers the actual legislative history of the text. 
1. Madison’s Initial Draft 
James Madison, who had experience in drafting revenue statutes, was 
undoubtedly familiar with both the English revenue statutes and the 1786 
Pennsylvania statute when he drafted the proto–Fourth Amendment as part of 
his larger proposal for a federal bill of rights.152 Unsurprisingly, he adopted the 
bare-probable-cause standard when he proposed the proto–Fourth 
Amendment: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and 
their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not 
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be 
seized.153 
Perhaps because there was general recognition of the importance of revenue 
enforcement,154 it does not appear that Madison’s choice of the bare-probable-
cause standard prompted any debate or controversy. The committee that 
initially reviewed Madison’s draft accepted the substance of his proto–Fourth 
Amendment and made only one change that was more than stylistic; 
specifically, the committee narrowed the scope of the protection by changing 
Madison’s “other property” to “effects”155—a term that appears to have been 
 
would be the situation in England. (Habeas corpus could be issued only by high court judges at that 
time.) Interestingly, Henry’s apparent assumption that a writ of habeas corpus would provide a remedy 
for the arrest implied that he thought that a general arrest warrant would be deemed to be illegal once 
it could be brought to the attention of “the judges.” See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 588 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
1838). Holmes argued that the new federal Congress should be prohibited, like the Massachusetts 
legislature already was, from “authoriz[ing] judicial authority to issue a[n arrest] warrant against a man 
for a crime, unless his being guilty of the crime was supported by oath or affirmation, prior to the 
warrant being granted.” See 2 id. at 111–12. 
 152. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 703 (noting Madison’s authorship of a Virginia 
customs statute). 
 153. Id. at 697. 
 154. The concern that the Bill of Rights not impede revenue collection may also account for the 
inclusion of the limitation “in any criminal case” in the self-accusation clause of the proto–Fifth 
Amendment. Id. at 705 n.450; Davies, Original Fifth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1015–17 (noting that 
the proponent of that addition was the primary drafter of the 1789 Collections Act and speculating that 
he was concerned the self-accusation provision not apply to the oaths involved in customs regulations). 
 155. The committee proposal was, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, [against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,] shall not be violated by warrants issuing, without 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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understood to refer primarily to moveable property of the sort found in houses, 
such as furniture, but could also include a merchant’s goods.156 Of course, 
Madison’s single-clause format, which the committee did not alter, was clearly 
focused only on banning general warrants.157 Indeed, his use of the collective 
term “the people” probably also reflected the focused ban against general 
warrants because such warrants, being unparticularized, threatened the security 
of the entire community.158 
2. The Final Change that Produced the Two-Clause Text 
The only other change made to Madison’s single-clause text was a last-
minute amendment during the final House debate that substituted “and no 
warrant shall issue” in place of Madison’s “by warrants issuing.” That change 
had the effect of altering Madison’s single-clause format to a two-clause 
provision,159 and adherents of the conventional account of Fourth Amendment 
history—although conceding that Madison’s single-clause draft had been aimed 
only at banning general warrants160—claim that this final change was made for 
the purpose of creating a broad “reasonableness” standard.161 However, that is 
pure myth. 
 
See, e.g., Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 166 n.521. The bracketed phrase, “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,” was actually omitted from the committee report—apparently by 
accident—but was reinserted at the beginning of the House debate on the provision. Id. 
 156. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 706–11 (discussing changes from “possessions” to 
“other property” to “effects” in the formulations of the scope of the ban against general warrants); id. 
at 708 nn.461–62 (discussing the use of the term “effects” in framing-era legal sources). See also, e.g., 1 
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining 
“effect” as “8. In the plural, effects are goods; moveables; personal estate. The people escaped from the 
town with their effects.”); Henry Laurens, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Court of Vice-
Admiralty (Pamphlet, Charleston, 1769), reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763–
1776 206 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1967) (stating that because of oppressive customs regulations, merchants 
“will be induced to draw their effects out of trade as much as possible”). 
 157. Madison’s focus on banning general warrants in the proto–Fourth Amendment was also 
evident from the fact that he described that provision as a ban against “general warrants” in his speech 
introducing his proposals for a Bill of Rights in the House. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 
699 n.435 (listing contemporary sources providing evidence for Madison’s intent). Madison’s innovation 
in using a single-clause format for the ban against general warrants appears to simply reflect his stylistic 
dislike of the right-therefore-rule formulation of the earlier state provisions. Id. at 697–99. 
 158. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 161–64 (arguing that Madison’s choice of 
individual or collective terminology when stating various rights reflected the nature of the right under 
discussion, and particularly noting the collective nature of the “right of the people” preserved in the 
Assembly and Petition Clause of the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, and the Fourth 
Amendment, as contrasted to the individual formulations of the Third Amendment, Fifth Amendment, 
and Sixth Amendment). 
 159. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 716–19. 
 160. Nearly all of the conventional commentators have conceded that Madison’s draft had clearly 
been aimed only at banning too-loose warrants. See id. at 699 n.434 (listing sources). 
 161. See id. at 568–70 (discussing the formulation of the conventional account and noting the 
numerous commentaries and opinions that have cited and followed that formulation). See also infra 
note 257 and accompanying text (discussing the invention of the conventional history in a 1937 
monograph publishing a 1934 Ph.D. dissertation). 
DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC 12/22/2010  3:30:17 PM 
40 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:1 
The only recorded objection to the single-clause draft was that it was merely 
“declaratory,” and all the final change to “and no warrant shall issue” actually 
did was to insert the explicit command that had been included in all of the 
earlier state bans against general warrants—namely, that a noncomplying 
warrant “ought not be granted.”162 Thus, although the last-minute change did 
produce a two-clause text, it was merely a by-product of the change, not its 
purpose.163 There is not so much as a scintilla of a suggestion in the legislative 
history that any member of the First Congress thought that the change created a 
novel “reasonableness” standard for all federal searches.164 Likewise, there is no 
indication that anyone interpreted the Fourth Amendment that way either in 
the immediate aftermath of the framing or during the following century.165 
Contrary to the conventional history, there is not a shred of historical support 
for the modern myth that the Framers intended for the Fourth Amendment to 
create any overall “reasonableness” standard for assessing all government 
intrusions.166 
E. The Bare-Probable-Cause Standard in Early Revenue Search-Warrant 
Provisions 
The record of the first several Congresses confirms the degree to which the 
federal Framers were concerned with revenue searches rather than criminal 
searches, but it also suggests that they may have had different attitudes toward 
customs and excise searches because the latter posed the greater danger to the 
security of houses. The first customs statute, the 1789 Collections Act (enacted 
shortly before the First Congress adopted the Bill of Rights), set different 
standards for customs searches of ships and places on land. With regard to 
 
 162. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 719–22 (discussing the objection to the declaratory 
character of “by warrants issuing”). Comparable commands had been included in all of the previous 
state warrant provisions as well as in the proposals for a ban against general warrants made by state 
ratification conventions. Id. 
 163. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 32–38, 166–69. 
 164. Because there is no record of any debate on the motion to substitute “and no warrant shall 
issue,” it does not appear that anyone present thought the change did anything novel. The conventional 
history is simply implausible when it asserts that a change as novel and fundamental as the creation of 
an overarching “reasonableness” standard for all government searches could have been made without 
prompting debate. 
 165. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 611–19 (noting that in the aftermath of the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights neither federal nor state cases attributed a broad “reasonableness” 
standard to the Fourth Amendment or to the state warrant provisions that also used the phrase 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that early constitutional commentators such as Justice 
Joseph Story also did not mention any “reasonableness” standard when discussing the Fourth 
Amendment, but simply treated that amendment as having banned the use of general warrants). 
 166. Because of the understanding of the division of power between the federal and state 
governments in 1789, it is implausible that the federal Framers anticipated that the federal government 
would be as generally involved in criminal law enforcement as the states. Hence, it is likely the federal 
Framers were thinking primarily about customs searches rather than criminal warrants when they 
adopted the text of the Fourth Amendment (especially since they had previously approved the Fifth 
Amendment’s provision that no person be denied of life, liberty, or property—the three forms of 
criminal punishments—except by “due process of law”). 
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ships, customs officers were authorized to make a warrantless search of “any 
ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares, or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.”167 But the statute recognized 
the need for a search warrant for places on land and provided as follows: 
If [the officer] shall have cause to suspect a concealment [of uncustomed goods], in 
any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, [he] shall, upon 
application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant 
to enter such house, store or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for 
such goods . . . .168 
It is unclear whether this provision was understood to require the officer to 
set out the factual grounds for his suspicion or merely to swear, in a conclusory 
fashion, that he possessed “cause to suspect” the location of smuggled goods.169 
If the statute was understood to require merely the latter, that understanding 
likely would have rested on a continuing acceptance of the doctrine that a 
revenue officer was liable for damages in a subsequent trespass action if he 
obtained and executed a revenue search warrant but found no untaxed goods 
and later could not prove adequate cause for the search to the satisfaction of a 
jury.170 
The provisions of the 1791 Hamilton Excise Act, which applied to distilled 
liquor, set different search standards for commercial premises and houses. Like 
the English excise statutes, it required that distilleries be registered with the 
excise office and provided that excise officers could inspect those commercial 
premises at will during the daytime.171 However, and perhaps because of public 
fears regarding widespread excise searches of houses,172 the excise-search 
provision regarding houses not only required use of a search warrant, but also 
provided that the “special warrant or warrants” could be issued only “upon 
reasonable cause of suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction [of the issuing 
judge or justice of the peace].”173 Thus, like the later English excise statutes, the 
1791 Act explicitly called for judicial assessment of the adequacy of the officer’s 
showing of “reasonable suspicion.” 
 
 167. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 711 n.470 (discussing differing interpretations of 
the search warrant provision). Unfortunately, there is a gap in the legislative record regarding the 
search-warrant provision. Id. 
 170. See supra note 145 (discussing the 1773 English ruling in Bostock); see also supra note 147 
(discussing the applicability of the Bostock ruling to American customs searches). 
The 1789 Collections Act did not prohibit trespass actions against an officer who obtained a search 
warrant: instead, it anticipated that trespass actions could be brought against the officer who initiated a 
search warrant but extended some indirect protection to customs officers, such as by providing for 
double costs to be awarded against a plaintiff who unsuccessfully sued a customs officer regarding a 
seizure. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 27, 1 Stat. 29, 43–44. 
 171. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 25, 26, 29, 1 Stat. 199, 205–07. 
 172. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 712 n.471 (discussing Congressional opposition to 
the Act). 
 173. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. at 207. In this provision, “special” was used as a 
synonym for “specific”; thus, a “special warrant” meant a particularized warrant. 
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In contrast to these revenue search provisions, the early Congresses did not 
adopt any statutory provisions regarding criminal arrests or searches. Rather, 
the 1789 Judiciary Act implicitly adopted existing state common-law arrest-
warrant and search-warrant standards when it directed federal judges and 
marshals to use the “usual mode of process” in the state in which a federal court 
sat.174 Indeed, the Congress never addressed the warrantless arrest authority of 
federal officers until 1935.175 Thus, because the early Congresses never 
attempted to apply the bare-probable-cause standard to criminal arrests or 
searches, it is implausible that the use of that standard in the Fourth 
Amendment was meant to do anything more than set a minimum standard that 
would accommodate federal revenue search warrants.176 
IV 
THE POST-FRAMING ADOPTION OF BARE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS AND THE INVENTION OF INVESTIGATORY CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
How, then, did bare probable cause come to be viewed as the general 
standard for criminal arrests and searches? The answer is that things did not 
develop as the Framers expected. The Cokean tradition of “due process of law” 
was lost (or rejected) during the nineteenth century, and the law of arrest was 
essentially deconstitutionalized. During this hiatus, state judges (not the 
legislatures, which the Framers had feared) enlarged the warrantless arrest 
authority of police officers to such a degree that the government gained 
 
 174. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (providing authority for any judge or justice 
of the peace to order arrest of a violator of federal law “agreeably to the usual mode of process” of the 
state). As noted above, “process” still referred to the form of authority for an arrest or search and 
would have included arrest warrants or search warrants. Of course, because the usual mode of process 
for a warrant or arrest in a state would have had to comply with the state constitutional standard, this 
approach would seem to have indirectly required that federal arrests and searches comply with the state 
“law of the land” or “due process of law” protections regarding criminal arrests. 
 175. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. A 1792 statute did provide that the federal 
“marshals of the several districts and their deputies shall have the same powers in executing the laws of 
the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states.” Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 18, § 9, 1 
Stat. 264, 265. Several judicial opinions and commentaries have misinterpreted this provision as though 
its purpose were to confer warrantless arrest authority on federal marshals. However, that was not the 
case. Indeed, as of 1792 state sheriffs had no special warrantless arrest authority beyond that possessed 
by any private person. See supra note 24. Instead, the 1792 provision was actually part of a “Militia Bill” 
and its apparent purpose was to authorize federal marshals to raise the posse commitatus of the county 
to put down a riot or insurrection if the local sheriff failed or refused to do so. That concern seems to 
have been based on fears of the potential for armed resistance to the 1791 excise (as actually occurred 
during the Whiskey Rebellion). For a more detailed discussion of this statute and its misinterpretation, 
see Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 157 n.491; Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 355–56; 
Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 611 n.171. 
 176. Perhaps because the bare-probable-cause standard was associated with revenue warrants rather 
than criminal warrants, state warrant provisions adopted after the framing of the bill of rights did not 
always copy the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard; instead, Tennessee and Illinois still 
followed the earlier Virginia formulation of “evidence of a fact committed,” while Ohio adopted the 
oxymoronic standard of “probable evidence of the fact committed.” Davies, Original Fourth, supra 
note 3, at 704 n.449. 
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drastically expanded investigatory powers. The result was that criminal 
procedure was fundamentally transformed. 
A.  The Initial Persistence of Common-Law Arrest Standards in the Aftermath 
of the Framing Era 
The common-law arrest standards described in part II were still evident in 
the immediate aftermath of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. For example, 
when James Wilson gave his 1790–1791 lectures in law in Philadelphia, he still 
included the felony-in-fact criterion for a warrantless arrest: 
It is a general rule, that, at any time, and in any place, every private person is justified 
in arresting a traitor or felon; and, if a treason or felony has been committed, he is 
justified in arresting even an innocent person, upon his reasonable suspicion that by 
such person it has been committed.177 
This same rule was also endorsed two decades later in Wakely v. Hart, a 
widely cited Pennsylvania arrest case that arose from a warrantless arrest for 
theft.178 The court stated that “even when there is only probable cause of 
suspicion, a private person may without warrant at his peril make an arrest [but] 
nothing short of proving the felony will justify the arrest.”179 Because there was 
no proof of a theft in fact, the court upheld a trespass judgment against a high 
constable who had assisted in making the arrest,180 and thus followed the 
framing-era rule that a peace officer possessed no greater felony warrantless-
arrest authority than a private person.181 The fundamental requirement of a 
felony in fact was still noted when Nathan Dane surveyed American arrest law 
in 1824.182 Additionally, on the few occasions when state courts referred to 
constitutional provisions in discussions of arrest standards during this period, 
they still looked to the “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions, 
rather than to the state provisions banning general warrants.183 
 
 177. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 685 (emphasis added). Note that Wilson’s 
reference to the arrest of “a traitor or felon” reflected the actual guilt justification of a warrantless 
felony arrest, while his qualification of “if a treason or felony has been committed” reflected the felony-
in-fact prong of the “on suspicion” justification. 
 178. 6 Pa. 315 (1814). 
 179. Id. at 318. 
 180. Id. at 318–19. 
 181. See supra note 24. 
 182. 5 DANE, supra note 40, at 588 (1824) (summarizing the 1796 trespass and false imprisonment 
ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Gale v. Hoyt as “to justify one man’s arresting 
another, without warrant or legal process, there must be, 1. Proof that a felony has been committed: and 
2. A reasonable cause to suspect the person arrested, has committed the felony”). 
 183. For example, when the New Hampshire Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of a 
statute that provided arrest authority for the offense of unnecessarily travelling on the Sabbath, the 
judges looked to the state “law of the land” provision—which they described as “a literal translation 
from Magna Carta c. 29” and characterized it as a “due process of law” provision—rather than to the 
state general warrant provision, which, like that of Massachusetts, referred to a right against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” See Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 55, 60 (1817). But the court in 
Mayo, after stating the common-law standards, nevertheless ignored those standards and approved a 
novel statutory grant of arrest authority as being within the legislative power. Id. at 57–59; see also 
Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 120–21 (summarizing the court’s ruling in Mayo). For later 
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But all of that was about to change. For one thing, legal education changed 
during the early nineteenth century as American lawyers put aside Coke’s 
Institutes and instead read Blackstone’s Commentaries—although the latter 
gave only a superficial treatment of criminal procedure and arrest law.184 For 
another, in the absence of an American legal-publishing industry, the American 
bench and bar remained reliant upon English treatises and cases under the 
rubric of a shared “common law”185—and English judges were about to 
drastically depart from the prior common law of arrest. 
B. The Invention and Importation of Bare Probable Cause as the Standard for 
Warrantless Felony Arrests 
Starting in 1780—after American independence—English judges responded 
to increasing urban crime and disorder by altering criminal-procedure standards 
in ways that facilitated arrests and evidence gathering.186 Of particular 
importance for the present discussion, they drastically enlarged the warrantless 
felony-arrest authority of peace officers, but not of private persons. This 
enlargement occurred in two steps: First, the judges differentiated the powers of 
a peace officer from that of a private person by allowing the officer to arrest on 
a “charge” of felony made by someone else, even if no felony had actually been 
committed. Second, they jettisoned the felony-in-fact requirement completely 
by allowing a peace officer (but not a private person) to make a warrantless 
arrest so long as he had probable cause that a felony might have been 
committed.187 
 
traces of the original understanding of “due process of law,” see, for example, In re Powers, 25 Vt. 261, 
261 n.1 (1853) (“Except in cases of reasonable belief of treason, or felony, or breach of the peace, 
committed in the presence of an officer, there is no due process of law without warrant issued by a 
court or magistrate . . . .”); infra note 260. 
 184. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 173–74 (noting that Blackstone’s Commentaries 
were intended to serve as an introduction to the study of law). 
 185. In the aftermath of independence, some states passed statutes prohibiting citations of English 
cases decided after July 4, 1776. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 186 n.586 (speculating 
that Wakely did not discuss Samuel for this reason). However, that prohibition was short-lived. 
 186. One of the judges’ innovations had offsetting implications. Specifically, English judges 
announced a more restrictive standard for admitting confessions obtained by complainant–prosecutors 
by ruling that “a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, 
comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it, and therefore it is rejected.” 
King v. Warrickshall, 1 Leach 263, 263–64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (Old Bailey 1783). But the judges 
ruled in the same case that, although induced confessions were inadmissible, the complainant–
prosecutors were permitted to exploit the information obtained during such inadmissible confessions to 
discover the location of stolen property, and the property itself was admissible as evidence. See id. The 
latter aspect of the ruling likely was of at least as much practical importance for obtaining convictions 
as the former. See Davies, Original Fifth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1021–24 (comparing the two 
aspects of the Warrickshall ruling). 
 187. See Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566 
(1936); see also Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 628 n.214. 
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1. The English “On Charge” Justification for a Warrantless Felony Arrest 
The first change was made in the 1780 ruling of the King’s Bench in Samuel 
v. Payne.188 Hall, a private person, had accused Samuel of stealing laces (a 
felony) and Constable Payne had assisted Hall in making a warrantless arrest of 
Samuel. However, the prosecution was dismissed for lack of proof that a felony 
had actually been committed (apparently the laces were never recovered). 
Samuel then sued both Hall and Constable Payne for trespass damages. Lord 
Mansfield, chief justice of the King’s Bench, presided at the trespass trial and 
instructed the jury that Constable Payne did not enjoy any special protection 
from trespass liability.189 The jury then found both Hall and Constable Payne 
liable for trespass.190 Constable Payne then moved for a new trial before the full 
bench of the King’s Bench, and the judges (including Mansfield) then ruled that 
the prior rule was “inconvenient” (inappropriate) and that only the person who 
made the false charge of felony, but not the peace officer who assisted, should 
be liable for the trespass resulting from the unlawful warrantless felony arrest.191 
On retrial, Hall, the accuser, was again found liable, but Constable Payne was 
not.192 Thereafter, officers enjoyed a degree of warrantless-arrest authority—the 
“on charge” justification—a private person did not. 
The Samuel ruling was soon discussed in some American sources, but 
American courts did not immediately follow it. For example, it was not 
mentioned when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the justification 
for a warrantless felony arrest in 1814193 (possibly because of a state statute that 
prohibited citation of English cases decided after 1776).194 Indeed, as late as 1824 
Nathan Dane discussed Samuel in his Digest of American Law with the 
cautionary introduction, “[i]f this case be law.”195 A New York court nonetheless 
 
 188. 1 Doug. 359, 360, 99 Eng. Rep. 230, 231 (K.B. 1780) (report first published 1782); see also 
Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 184–85 (discussing the case). 
 189. See also CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 109, 116–17 (extracting an essay by 
Saunders Welch, a high constable of London, advising constables that if they arrest on the report of a 
felony by another person, based on the other person’s knowledge, they should require the other person 
to attend the arrest, and further advising that “in all cases of [arrest on] suspicion, not from your own 
knowledge, the safest way is to refer the parties to a justice of the peace, and act on his warrant”). 
 190. Samuel, 1 Doug. at 359–60, 99 Eng. Rep. at 230–31. 
 191. Id. Five years later, Mansfield summed up the post-Samuel rule of warrantless felony arrest by 
saying “[w]hen a felony has been committed, any person may arrest on reasonable suspicion. When no 
felony has been committed, an officer may arrest on a charge.” Cooper v. Boot, 4 Doug. 339, 343, 99 
Eng. Rep. 911, 913 (K.B. 1785). However, this report of Cooper was not published until 1831. Davies, 
Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 561 n.19. 
 192. Samuel, 1 Doug. at 360 n.8, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231 n.8. 
 193. See, e.g., the 1814 Pennsylvania Wakely decision, discussed supra notes 179–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 194. See supra note 185. 
 195. 3 DANE, supra note 40, at 72 (volume published 1824). Dane actually overstated Samuel when 
he wrote, “If this case be law, it settles the long agitated point, and proves a peace officer may arrest on 
a reasonable suspicion of felony without a warrant, though no felony has been committed.” Id. Samuel 
actually did not go that far; rather it relieved the officer of trespass liability only if the officer arrested 
on a charge of felony made by another person. 
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imported Samuel’s “on charge” justification in 1829,196 and thereafter American 
jurisdictions generally accepted the on-charge justification for a warrantless 
felony arrest by a peace officer.197 
2. The Bare-Probable-Cause Justification for Warrantless Felony Arrests 
English judges made the second and more-fundamental innovation when 
they eliminated the felony-in-fact requirement for a lawful warrantless arrest by 
a peace officer in the 1827 ruling Beckwith v. Philby.198 Philby, a constable, 
suspected from circumstances and comments (but not “charges”) made by 
others that Beckwith had stolen a horse; so he arrested Beckwith. It turned out, 
however, that the horse was not stolen, so no felony had actually been 
committed. Beckwith then sued Philby for trespass damages for false arrest 
because the arrest was plainly unlawful under common-law doctrine. But Chief 
Justice Tenterden ruled that an officer could make a lawful felony arrest if there 
were reasonable grounds to suspect a felony had been committed, even if none 
had.199 Notably, Tenderden’s Beckwith opinion did not admit its innovation (as 
Samuel had) but instead pretended to simply be applying existing law.200 Later 
English commentators then embellished that judicial falsehood.201 
In a real sense, Beckwith’s adoption of the bare-probable-cause standard for 
warrantless felony arrests marks the birth of modern investigatory criminal 
procedure. The new rule allowed an officer to draw inferences regarding a 
possible felony from hearsay accounts provided by persons who were unable or 
unwilling to act as a named complainant. Indeed, a complainant alleging 
personal knowledge of a felony was no longer needed. Instead, the peace officer 
could arrest on his own judgment and initiative, and enjoyed considerable 
latitude for making erroneous arrests. This new investigatory power 
undoubtedly facilitated the development of modern policing when the first 
English police department, the London “Bobbies,” was formed two years after 
Beckwith was decided.202 
 
 196. The earliest American reported decision to adopt the Samuel rule seems to have been Holley v. 
Mix, 3 Wend. 350, 353 (N.Y. 1829). 
 197. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 636. 
 198. 6 B. & C. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1827). 
 199. Id. at 638–39, 108 Eng. Rep. at 586. A similar ruling was announced two years later in Davis v. 
Russell, 5 Bing. 354, 362–68, 130 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102–04 (C.C. 1829). 
 200. Beckwith cited Samuel’s “on charge” rule as though it were the same as probable cause of a 
crime, which it was not. Beckwith, 6 B. & C. at 636, 638–96, 108 Eng. Rep. at 585, 586. 
 201. See, e.g., 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193 
(1883) (attributing the probable-cause standard to Hale’s treatise, but not giving any specific page cite 
for that claim); see also Hall, supra note 187, at 567 (criticizing Stephen’s claim). 
 202. See, e.g., 4 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 158–207 (1968) (discussing the creation of the London police 
department in 1829). 
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3. The American Importation of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard for 
Warrantless Felony Arrests 
American state judges, who also appear to have become concerned with 
increasing disorder and property crime, began to import the new English bare-
probable-cause standard for warrantless felony arrests around the middle of the 
nineteenth century. The earliest American reported case to endorse bare 
probable cause appears to have been the 1844 Pennsylvania decision Russell v. 
Shuster.203 Massachusetts followed in 1850,204 and most other American 
jurisdictions had done likewise by the end of the nineteenth century.205 Thus, 
Chief Justice Taft could correctly describe the bare-probable-cause standard as 
the “usual rule” for warrantless felony arrests in his 1925 majority opinion in 
Carroll v. United States.206 Like the English judges who decided Beckwith, the 
American judges who imported the bare-probable-cause standard pretended to 
be merely applying prior common law while actually ignoring the earlier felony-
in-fact requirement.207 Notably, none of those judges mentioned either the 
Fourth Amendment or any of the state provisions that tracked the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause standard for warrants. Rather, bare probable 
cause was simply imported as part of what the judges described as the “common 
law” of arrest. 
The importation of the bare-probable-cause standard for warrantless felony 
arrests provoked some resistance. A North Carolina judge opined in 1856 that 
the new standard “go[es] very far in the justification of officers, who apprehend 
suspected persons without warrants . . . farther than is compatible with that 
 
 203. 8 Watts & Serg. 308, 309 (Pa. 1844) (reporting that Chief Justice Gibson recited that “[a] 
constable may justify an arrest for reasonable cause of suspicion alone; and in this respect he stands on 
more favorable ground than a private person, who must show, in addition to such cause, that a felony 
was actually committed”). For a brief discussion of the case, see Davies, Correcting History, supra note 
3, at 188 n.593. 
 204. Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 284 (1850) (reciting that “[p]eace-officers without 
warrant may arrest suspected felons,” and citing Samuel and Beckwith while falsely claiming that the 
1814 Pennsylvania ruling in Wakely “is to the same effect”). Wakely is discussed supra notes 179–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 205. Later in the nineteenth century state legislatures often included the bare-probable-cause 
standard for warrantless felony arrests in state arrest statutes. See, e.g., Bad Elk v. United States, 177 
U.S. 529, 535–36 (1900) (describing a state statute that included the “on charge” and “probable cause” 
justifications for felony arrest as a codification of “common law”). However, some states have never 
bothered to formally enact the bare-probable-cause standard. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-103 
(2010) (stating grounds for arrest by officer without warrant but including the felony-in-fact 
requirement and omitting the bare-probable-cause-standard itself). 
 206. 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (“The usual rule is that a police officer may arrest without warrant one 
believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
 207. For example, in 1844 the Pennsylvania court did not mention that it was effectively overruling 
its own earlier 1814 decision in Wakely (discussed supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text) when it 
adopted the Beckwith probable cause justification. Russell, 8 Watts. & Serg. at 309 (citing no prior 
authorities regarding the felony arrest standard although counsel had cited Wakely). Likewise, when 
the Massachusetts court adopted the novel Beckwith probable-cause justification in 1850, it incorrectly 
cited the 1780 English ruling in Samuel and the 1814 Pennsylvania ruling in Wakely as being “to the 
same effect”—which neither was. Rohan, 59 Mass. at 284. 
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personal liberty, of which English jurists are so fond of boasting.”208 New York 
reinstituted the felony-in-fact requirement by statute, and still required proof of 
a felony in fact to justify a warrantless felony arrest as late as 1939.209 Similarly, 
Congress initially included a felony-in-fact requirement when it finally got 
around to enacting statutory warrantless arrest authority for FBI officers in 
1935, but then dropped that requirement in 1948.210 
C. Defining “Probable Cause” 
Of course, the definition of “probable cause” took on additional significance 
when it became the stand-alone standard for criminal arrests. The federal courts 
had had several occasions to define probable cause during the decades that 
immediately followed the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The earliest Supreme 
Court discussion of probable cause seems to have occurred in the 1807 ruling in 
Ex parte Bollman.211 In that habeas corpus proceeding, the Marshall Court ruled 
that an arrest warrant for treason lacked the probable cause required by the 
Fourth Amendment because no evidence had been offered to show 
“unequivocally” that the arrestees had actually engaged in levying war against 
the United States.212 Thus, Bollman seems to have construed probable cause for 
a criminal arrest warrant to require factual accusations that amounted to a 
prima facie showing of guilt. 
A few years later in 1811, Justice Bushrod Washington had occasion to 
define the probable cause required to support an arrest by warrant while 
presiding in a malicious prosecution case, Munns v. De Nemours.213 The 
defendants had obtained an arrest warrant and indictment of Munns for theft of 
a brass pounder used in producing gunpowder. Although it appeared that the 
pounder had been stolen by another man who had recently been in Munns’ 
company, the jury in a Delaware state criminal trial acquitted Munns of the 
theft. Munns then sued for malicious prosecution, and the defendants removed 
the case to the federal circuit court under diversity jurisdiction. While presiding 
at the civil trial, Washington charged the jury that probable cause was a defense 
to liability even if the defendants had acted with malice. 
 
 208. Brockway v. Crawford, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 433, 439–40 (1856) (Battle, J., dissenting) (specifically 
criticizing the English rulings in Samuel and Beckwith). 
 209. See Morgan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (interpreting 
state statute to permit police to arrest without warrant only when a felony has in fact been committed). 
 210. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 210–12. 
 211. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126–37 (1807). In an earlier proceeding in the same matter in the Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia, Chief Judge Cranch had also opined that the issuance of the arrest 
warrant in the case was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Bollman, 24 F. 
Cas. 1189, 1190, 1192–93 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622) (still identifying the Fourth Amendment as the 
“sixth article of the amendments”). 
 212. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 110. Note that the Treason Clause in Article III explicitly makes 
taking up arms an element of treason. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 213. 17 Fed. Cas. 993 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9926). 
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Washington further charged that “probable cause” meant “a reasonable 
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in 
themselves to warrant [justify] a cautious man in the belief, that the person 
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”214 Washington’s 
formulation of probable cause appears to have drawn upon Hawkins’ earlier 
“candid and impartial man” formulation,215 but Washington’s definition added 
“belief, that the person accused is guilty” to Hawkins’s strong “suspicion” as 
though the two concepts were equivalent—notwithstanding that “belief” set a 
higher threshold than “suspicion.”216 Washington then advised the jury that in 
the circumstances of this case (in which an arrest warrant had issued and a 
grand jury had indicted), the defendants did have probable cause, and the jury 
found for the defendants.217 
However, the federal courts treated probable cause differently in 
noncriminal customs proceedings. In particular, the Marshall Court in 1813 
gave a shorter and more relaxed definition of “probable cause” in the context of 
customs enforcement in Locke v. United States.218 Under the federal customs 
statutes, if a prosecuting customs officer showed probable cause that a customs 
violation had been committed—even though he could not specify when or how 
it had been done—the burden of proof shifted to the claimant, who opposed the 
condemnation of a ship or goods, to prove that customs requirements had been 
complied with.219 In the course of upholding the shifting of the burden of proof 
on the condemnation at issue, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “in all cases of 
[customs] seizure [probable cause] has a fixed and well known meaning. It 
imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.”220 Yet 
Marshall did not suggest that this definition applied to criminal warrants, and 
notably, in another customs case during the same term, Attorney General 
 
 214. Id. at 995. The verb “to warrant . . . a belief” is a synonym for “to justify a belief” or “to 
authorize a belief”; it was not a reference to a judicial arrest or search warrant. 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 73. Of course, Washington did not include any citations to 
authority in the jury charge in Munns. The likelihood that Washington consulted Hawkins’ treatise is 
nonetheless supported by Washington’s doubt about whether it was necessary, for the justification of 
the execution of an arrest warrant, that a theft had actually been committed. Compare Munns, 17 Fed 
Cas. at 996, with Hawkins’ view, discussed supra text accompanying note 72. 
 216. In his 1828 dictionary, Noah Webster, who was a contemporary of the American framing era, 
defined “believe” as “to be persuaded of the truth of something upon the declaration of another, or 
upon evidence” and as “[t]o have a firm persuasion of anything.” 1 WEBSTER, supra note 156 (pages 
unnumbered). In contrast, he defined “suspect” as “to imagine or have a slight opinion that something 
exists, but without proof and often upon weak evidence or no evidence at all,” and gave essentially the 
same definition for “suspicion.” 2 id. He also defined “probable” as meaning “[l]ikely; having more 
evidence than the contrary, or evidence which inclines the mind to belief, but leaves some room for 
doubt.” 2 id. Given these definitions, the older phrasing of “probable cause to suspect” was something 
of an oxymoron; “probable cause to believe” was more congruent. 
 217. Munns, 17 Fed Cas. at 997. Washington also stated that it was for the jury to determine the 
truth of the circumstances on which probable cause was allegedly based, but that it was for the court to 
determine whether those circumstances constituted probable cause. Id. at 995. 
 218. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). 
 219. Id. at 348. 
 220. Id. 
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Pinkney argued that customs procedure should be more relaxed than criminal 
procedure.221 Likewise, Justice Washington’s joining in the seemingly weaker 
statement of probable cause in the Locke ruling without comment also seems to 
confirm that “probable cause” carried a looser meaning in the customs seizure 
context than in the criminal arrest context he had addressed in Munns. 
Justice Washington’s definition of probable cause in Munns was widely cited 
in later false-imprisonment or malicious-prosecution cases that arose from 
criminal proceedings.222 However, later cases sometimes offered slight variations 
regarding the “suspicion” and “belief” thresholds for probable cause,223 and a 
few state courts vacillated between defining probable cause as information that 
supported a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee had committed a felony or as 
a reasonable belief that the arrestee had committed a felony.224 It may be 
significant, though, that, even under the criterion of a strong suspicion or belief 
in guilt, appellate courts reviewing malicious prosecution jury verdicts tended to 
rule that the facts in the cases satisfied that standard.225 
Justice Hunt’s 1878 opinion for the Supreme Court in Stacey v. Emery226 also 
endorsed Washington’s Munns definition of probable cause in the course of 
discussing grounds for a certificate of probable cause in customs proceedings. 
Hunt stated that the threshold for probable cause was met “[i]f the facts and 
circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and 
 
 221. See The Schooner Jane v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 363, 363 (1813) (recording 
comments from Attorney General Pinkney that “[i]f these [condemnation] cases are to be likened to 
criminal prosecutions, and if the same strictness be required, it will be impossible to execute the laws 
[regulating imports].”). 
 222. See, e.g., Cabiness v. Martin, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 454, 455–56 (1832); Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Den. 
617, 619 (1846). 
 223. A slight variation appeared in Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 217, 238–39 (1849) 
(“Probable cause is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary 
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person accused is 
guilty.”). See also Eastman v. Keasor, 44 N.H. 518, 520 (1863) (following Bacon and attributing the 
definition in that case to Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court). 
There were other formulations. See Burt v. Smith, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (N.Y. 1905) (“Probable cause is the 
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he 
has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of.”); Runo v. Williams, 
122 P. 1082, 1085 (Cal. 1912) (“Probable cause is, in effect, the concurrence of the belief of guilt with 
the existence of facts and circumstances reasonably warranting the belief.”). 
 224. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 380 n.480 (discussing the different standards). 
 225. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Leland, 1 Me. 135, 138 (1820) (overturning jury verdict for plaintiff in 
malicious prosecution action while noting the “liberality of construction on the question of probable 
cause, in favor of the prosecutor . . .”); Swaim v. Stafford, 25 N.C. 289, 293 (1843) (overturning jury 
verdict for plaintiff in malicious prosecution action while concluding that “[a]ll these facts and 
circumstances, as it seems to us, were sufficiently strong to induce the defendant to believe that the 
plaintiff was guilty, and in law amounted to a probable cause . . .”); Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Denio 617, 
620–21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) (permitting new trial in malicious prosecution action after verdict for 
plaintiff while stating that “the verdict was clearly wrong”); Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. 217, 238–42 
(1849) (setting aside verdict for plaintiff in malicious prosecution action because trial judge did not 
properly instruct the jury as to the facts that might prove probable cause). 
 226. 97 U.S. 642 (1878). 
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caution in believing that the offense has been committed.”227 Thus, Stacey 
effectively applied the criminal definition of probable cause to customs 
proceedings, as well, and ended the distinction that seemed to have been 
recognized in Locke. The Stacey definition then became the formulation that 
federal courts generally used on later occasions,228 including the Supreme 
Court’s 1925 ruling in Carroll v. United States229 and the 1949 ruling in Brinegar 
v. United States.230 
D. How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard for 
Warrantless Felony Arrests Transformed Criminal Procedure 
No matter how bare probable cause was defined, the adoption of that 
standard facilitated a drastic expansion of government arrest and search 
authority. Indeed, it is hardly a coincidence that the adoption of this relaxed 
standard more or less coincided with the appearance of urban police 
departments.231 
Common-law accusatory procedure had been dependent on a private 
complainant’s willingness to denounce a crime that had actually been 
committed. As a result, government officers had been allowed little room to 
initiate criminal prosecutions themselves. Indeed, the requirement of a named 
complainant alleging personal knowledge of the crime, coupled with the risks 
that attended that role, had constituted the principal protection that the 
common law offered against arbitrary warrantless arrest. However, adoption of 
the bare-probable-cause warrantless felony-arrest standard destroyed that 
protection by allowing government officers to initiate criminal prosecutions by 
“ferreting out criminal activity” on their own assessment of the circumstances.232 
As a result, the bare-probable-cause standard substantially enlarged the room 
for police officers to justify mistaken arrests of innocent persons. Moreover, 
although the bare-probable-cause standard directly justified only warrantless 
arrests for felony offenses, it carried far broader practical implications for 
 
 227. Id. at 645. 
 228. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 289 F. 236, 238 ( 8th Cir. 1923) (“Probable cause which will 
justify an arrest is reasonable grounds of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in 
themselves to warrant a cautious man in his belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense of 
which he is suspected.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 658 (N.D. W. Va. 1922) 
(same). 
 229. 267 U.S. 132, 161, 162 (1925) (quoting the definition of probable cause in Stacey and then 
slightly revising that in the context of the specific issue in the case by stating that the officers’ search 
was justified because “the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that [illegal liquor was in the car]”). 
 230. 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 231. See, e.g., JAMES P. HALL, PEACEKEEPING IN AMERICA: A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF 
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 86 (1975) (noting that the transition from urban nightwatches to 
police departments occurred in New York City in 1844, in Chicago in 1851, in New Orleans and 
Cincinnati in 1852, in Boston and Philadelphia in 1854). 
 232. The famous “ferreting” phrase is Justice Jackson’s. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
14 (1949). 
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criminal procedure. One implication was that the relaxed standard for 
warrantless felony arrests increased the opportunities for police to make 
warrantless searches—and thus discover evidence of additional crimes. 
The adoption of bare probable cause as the standard for warrantless felony 
arrests also seems to have spilled over and affected arrest warrant standards in 
several ways. For one thing, the common-law requirement of an allegation of 
crime-in-fact for issuance of an arrest or search warrant seems to have 
disappeared soon after the adoption of bare probable cause as a warrantless 
arrest standard.233 Likewise, allowing the use of hearsay information that would 
have been inadmissible at trial to support a finding of probable cause for a 
warrantless felony arrest seems to have led to allowing hearsay to support the 
issuance of an arrest warrant as well.234 The rationale for these relaxations of 
warrant standards likely was that it made no sense to require an officer to 
present more or better information to obtain a felony arrest warrant than he 
would need to justify a warrantless felony arrest.235 That change, in turn, 
eventually led to allowing “confidential informants”—who play a prominent 
role in modern police investigations—whose identity is never disclosed to the 
defendant, or even to the issuing magistrate or reviewing court.236 Likewise, the 
oath requirement came to mean little more than that a police affiant swore to 
having received unsworn hearsay information from someone else. 
Of course, the expansion of the warrantless arrest authority of the officer 
also ultimately led to an overall decline of warrant usage. That in turn meant 
that magistrates ceased to actively supervise police decisions as to whether to 
make searches or arrests and instead merely assessed such actions after they 
occurred. The shift to police-initiated arrests also appears to have opened the 
 
 233. The requirement of an accusation of a felony in fact for issuance of an arrest warrant may have 
disappeared virtually contemporaneously with the adoption of the bare-probable-cause standard for 
warrantless felony arrests. For example, an 1853 treatise published in New York stated that a 
magistrate could issue an arrest warrant “[i]f in reference to the creditability of the complainant, and to 
all matters stated by him, there are, according to the understanding of the magistrate, reasonable 
grounds for supposing the accused to be guilty” and that, with regard to “the amount of evidence” 
required “in order to authorize the magistrate to grant his warrant, no very definite rule has been or 
can be laid down,” but “[i]t is sufficient if the testimony shows a probable case of guilt.” 1 A COMPLETE 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30 n.1 (Thomas W. Waterman ed., Albany N.Y., 
Gould, Banks & Co. 1853). 
 234. In 1932 the Supreme Court still stated that “[a] search warrant may issue only upon evidence 
which would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury”—a standard that would seem to 
preclude use of hearsay. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932). However, the Court 
subsequently described Grau’s statement as an anomaly in Brinegar v United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 
n.13 (1949). 
 235. Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269–70 (1960) (noting that it would be “incongruous” 
to apply a higher standard for probable cause to support an arrest warrant than that which would 
suffice for a warrantless arrest). 
 236. Early cases that permitted probable cause for an arrest to be based on informant hearsay 
tended to require that the informant be identified, notwithstanding the general “informant’s privilege” 
recognized in the law of evidence. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW 769 n.9 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (citing cases). 
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way for police interrogation of suspects.237 Hence, it is not too much to say that 
the adoption of the bare-probable-cause standard for warrantless felony arrests 
transformed criminal procedure.238 
V 
THE INVENTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS AND THE 
ADOPTION OF BARE PROBABLE CAUSE AS A WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
STANDARD 
The Supreme Court formulated modern Fourth Amendment doctrine 
during the early decades of the twentieth century. The seminal ruling was the 
1914 decision in Weeks v. United States.239 In that case, the Supreme Court 
innovated in several ways: (1) it ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
the conduct of a federal officer as well as to the courts and Congress;240 (2) in 
ruling that a warrantless search of a house by a federal marshal violated the 
Fourth Amendment, it read the common-law requirement of a warrant for a 
house search into the Fourth Amendment itself;241 and (3) it created the search-
and-seizure exclusionary rule when it held (in an echo of Marbury v. Madison)242 
that a federal court did not possess authority to admit evidence that 
government officers had obtained in violation of the Constitution.243 Although 
Weeks and the cases that immediately followed it actually applied the Fourth 
Amendment only to searches of houses or offices, usually for papers,244 the onset 
of Prohibition in 1920 soon presented new search issues. 
 
 237. See Davies, Original Fifth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1030–32 (discussing the effects of the 
shift to investigatory criminal procedure). 
 238. For a discussion of the emergence of modern policing during the nineteenth century, see 
Wesley M. Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447 
(2010). 
 239. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 240. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 729–30. 
 241. Id. at 730. 
 242. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (holding that federal courts lack constitutional authority to 
apply an unconstitutional statute because “a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and . . . courts, as 
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument”). 
 243. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 730, n.521. The exclusionary rule did not appear 
“late,” as its critics sometimes claim; rather, the rule was created roughly contemporaneously with the 
appearance of the modern conception that unlawful conduct by officers constitutes a form of 
government action. Thomas Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp v. Ohio That Misses the Larger 
Exclusionary Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 622–25 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Mapp]; see also 
supra note 96. Cf. Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on the Search 
and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821, 1852–62 (2002). 
 244. E.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (unlawful seizure of 
business records from office); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (warrantless seizure of 
paper from office); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (warrantless entry of house). 
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A. The Invention of Warrantless Searches (Beyond Those Incident to Arrest) 
in Carroll v. United States 
Enforcement of Prohibition necessarily required searches for illegal liquor, 
including searches of automobiles transporting illegal liquor. Because it was not 
feasible for police to obtain warrants to search automobiles, the federal courts 
were confronted with whether the Fourth Amendment permitted warrantless 
searches of automobiles. Although the Supreme Court had acknowledged the 
continuing validity of the common-law search-incident-to-arrest doctrine in 
dicta in Weeks,245 there was a doctrinal obstacle that prevented use of the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine. The difficulty was that Prohibition violations were 
often misdemeanors.246 But under common-law or statutory standards it was still 
the rule that bare probable cause could justify a warrantless arrest only for a 
felony; a warrantless misdemeanor arrest was lawful only when the 
misdemeanor was actually being committed “in the view of” or “presence of” 
the arresting officer—a standard understood to mean that the officer had to 
actually observe the offense being committed.247 Because the illegal liquor being 
transported in a vehicle was rarely in plain view, neither a warrantless arrest nor 
a search incident to such an arrest could usually be justified. 
However, because investigatory searches were plainly necessary if police 
were to enforce Prohibition offenses, the lower federal courts showed 
considerable creativity in upholding warrantless automobile searches.248 Their 
most notable response was to begin to construe the right against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” set out in the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as 
though it created a free-standing “reasonableness” standard for assessing 
government searches. These courts then announced, without citing precedent, 
that the Fourth Amendment did not forbid all warrantless searches; rather, it 
forbade only “unreasonable” warrantless searches, and a warrantless search was 
reasonable and constitutional so long as the officers had bare probable cause 
 
 245. See 232 U.S. 383, 392 (indicating that the Court was not disapproving “an assertion of the right 
on the part of the Government . . . to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover 
and seize the fruits or evidences of crime . . . [n]or is it the case of burglar’s tools or other proofs of guilt 
found upon his arrest within the control of the accused”). 
However, the new exclusionary rule exerted an indirect effect on arrest law. As a practical matter, the 
legality of an arrest mattered primarily to assess the constitutionality of the search that accompanied it. 
But because the constitutionality of searches was tested in motions to suppress evidence decided prior 
to trial, the old ex post, actual-guilt justification (discussed supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text), 
which depended on a conviction at trial, became irrelevant. 
 246. The National Prohibition Act defined first or second offenses as misdemeanors, third offenses 
as felonies. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
 247. See id. at 157 (noting that “the [misdemeanor] is not committed in [the officer’s] presence 
unless he can by his senses detect that the liquor is being transported”). 
 248. See, e.g., United States v. Fenton, 268 F. 221, 222–23 (D. Mont. 1920) (ruling that the United 
States was “vested with the right of property and possession” in illegal liquor, and thus was entitled to 
seize it); United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 235 (S.D. Cal. 1922) (“[I]t is not unreasonable for a 
prohibition enforcement officer to stop automobiles upon the public highway and search them for 
intoxicating liquors without a warrant, and the finding of liquor justifies the search.”). 
DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC 12/22/2010  3:30:17 PM 
Summer 2010]        ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD 55 
that a violation was occurring.249 The Supreme Court adopted this novel 
construction of the Fourth Amendment in 1925 in Carroll v. United States when 
it held that bare probable cause sufficed for a constitutional warrantless search 
of an automobile (even though it could not justify a warrantless arrest).250 
Two features of Chief Justice Taft’s Carroll opinion are noteworthy here. 
One is that it reiterated the traditional formulation—previously articulated in 
Munns and Stacey—that probable cause was met if “the facts and circumstances 
within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant [that is, to justify] a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that [an offense has been or is being 
committed].”251 But there was arguably a gap between that verbiage and the 
substance of the definition; as Justice McReynolds pithily pointed out in dissent, 
the facts in Carroll were such that the majority had effectively ruled there was 
probable cause to search a car merely “because a man once agreed to deliver 
whisky, but did not . . . [and] thereafter he venture[d] to drive an automobile on 
the road to Detroit.”252 
The other noteworthy feature of Taft’s opinion was the purportedly 
originalist justification he offered to support Carroll’s claim that warrantless 
searches of vehicles were “reasonable” and thus constitutional, so long as the 
officer had probable cause. Specifically, Taft noted in the 1789 Collections Act 
the First Congress had authorized customs officers to make warrantless 
searches of ships if the officer had “reason to suspect” a customs violation.253 
But this claim was merely an instance of judicial-chambers historical fiction.254 
The Framers would have understood that ships were not included among the 
“houses, papers, and effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment; indeed, that 
formula likely was included precisely to exclude ships.255 Thus, the Framers 
would not have thought that the Fourth Amendment had any bearing on 
customs searches of ships—or vice versa. Indeed, although the Supreme Court 
had decided numerous ship-seizure cases between 1789 and 1925, none had ever 
so much as mentioned the Fourth Amendment.256 
 
 249. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 658 (N.D.W. Va. 1922) (Fourth Amendment 
prohibits unreasonable searches, not warrantless searches); Lambert v. United States, 282 F. 413, 416–
17 (9th Cir. 1922) (Fourth Amendment prohibits “all unreasonable searches” and what is unreasonable 
must necessarily be determined according to the facts and circumstances); United States v. McBride, 
287 F. 214, 216 (S.D. Ala. 1922) (Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable search, not 
warrantless search); Green v. United States, 289 F. 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1923) (same). 
 250. 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925). 
 251. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. This definition was repeated with minor changes in Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949), and is now usually cited to Brinegar rather than Carroll. 
 252. 267 U.S. at 174. 
 253. Id. at 150 (citing 1789 Collections Act, 1 Stat. 29, 43). 
 254. This historical claim seems to have been composed by Taft; it does not appear in the briefs filed 
in Carroll. 
 255. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 256. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 607–08. 
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Carroll’s endorsement of reading the first clause of the Fourth Amendment 
as a free-standing Reasonableness Clause was also the likely catalyst for the 
fabrication of the academic version of conventional Fourth Amendment 
history. In a dissertation published as a monograph in 1937, political scientist 
Nelson B. Lasson asserted that the last-minute change during the House debate 
in which Madison’s “by warrants issuing” had been replaced with “and no 
warrant shall issue”—the change that had created the final two-clause text—had 
been made for the purpose of creating an overarching “reasonableness” 
standard for all government searches.257 Although there was not a shred of 
evidence for that fanciful claim,258 it dovetailed so nicely with the Supreme 
Court’s own textual creativity that it became the cornerstone for the 
conventional account of Fourth Amendment history.259 
B. Probable Cause as the Federal Statutory and Constitutional Standard for 
Warrantless Felony Arrests 
Carroll explicitly applied the Fourth Amendment’s bare-probable-cause 
standard to assessing the constitutionality of the search at issue, but still 
discussed the arrest only in terms of “the usual rule” for a lawful arrest.260 This 
narrow focus on searches was still evident in 1949 when the Court reiterated 
Carroll’s formulation of probable cause in another automobile search case, 
Brinegar v. United States.261 Although Justice Rutledge’s majority opinion in 
Brinegar did state at one point that “[t]he crucial question is whether there was 
probable cause for Brinegar’s arrest,” all of the analysis in the opinion was in 
terms of whether “probable cause to search exist[ed].”262 
 
 257. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100–03 (1937). Lasson’s monograph was his dissertation: Nelson 
B. Lisansky, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment (Ph.D. Dissertation, Political 
Science, Johns Hopkins University, 1934). Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 27 n.45. 
Lasson also invented a rather preposterous claim that the motion to substitute “and no warrant shall 
issue” was voted down in the House, but then was surreptitiously added in by the later committee on 
style. See LASSON, supra, at 102–03. Yet, although there are conflicting accounts of the House debate, 
including even the identity of the person who made the motion, the weight of available evidence clearly 
indicates that the motion for the substitution carried. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 716–21. 
 258. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 569 n.38 (citing opinions and commentaries that 
have uncritically repeated Lasson’s claims). 
 260. 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). Indeed, Justice McReyold’s dissent asserted that the warrantless 
misdemeanor arrest in that case “was unauthorized, illegal, and violated the guarantee of due process 
given by the Fifth Amendment”—but did not apply the Fourth Amendment to the arrest. Id. at 170 
(emphasis added). 
 261. 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949). 
 262. See also Justice Minton’s 1950 discussion that “[o]f course, a search without warrant incident to 
an arrest is dependent initially on a valid arrest” but that “[w]here one had been placed in the custody 
of the law by valid action of officers, it was not unreasonable to search him” and “[i]t is [only] 
unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950). 
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One explanation for the Court’s slowness in applying the Fourth 
Amendment’s bare-probable-cause standard to warrantless arrests was that 
Congress did not get around to adopting statutory warrantless-felony-arrest 
authority for federal officers until the 1930s, which meant that the warrantless-
arrest authority of federal officers depended on state law. Moreover, when 
Congress finally did act, it initially reverted to the framing-era requirement that 
a felony had to have been actually committed in fact, and it further limited the 
warrantless arrest authority of FBI agents to instances in which there were 
reasonable grounds to fear that the person to be arrested would escape if the 
agent undertook to obtain an arrest warrant.263 Congress deleted the felony-in-
fact requirement in 1948 and deleted the reason-to-fear-escape criterion in 
1950.264 Thereafter, in the 1959 ruling Draper v. United States, the Supreme 
Court announced that the statutory probable-cause standard was equivalent to 
the constitutional standard for warrantless felony arrests.265 
VI 
PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE WARREN COURT 
The Warren Court’s “due process revolution” during the 1960s consisted 
largely of “incorporating” federal constitutional criminal-procedure standards 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, making the federal 
standards applicable to state criminal proceedings.266 In particular, the Court 
announced the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment in 1960 in Elkins v. 
United States267 and applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states in 1961 in 
Mapp v. Ohio.268 
Additionally, the Warren Court shored up the “warrant requirement”269 and 
made significant rulings regarding the use of informant hearsay to establish 
probable cause; but these latter rulings carried contrasting implications. On the 
one hand, the Court sought to ensure that police would provide a magistrate 
with adequate information to independently assess whether there was probable 
cause to support a warrant when the police were relying on a confidential 
 
 263. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 208–11. 
 264. Id. at 211–12. 
 265. 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (equating “probable cause” in the Fourth Amendment with 
“reasonable grounds” in the arrest provision of the Narcotic Control Act); see also Henry v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (equating the “reasonable grounds” statutory standard for warrantless 
arrests by FBI agents with the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard); Davies, Correcting 
History, supra note 3, at 212–13. 
 266. See, e.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 415–16 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002) 
(chronicling the process of incorporation). 
 267. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Despite the widespread view that the substance of the Fourth Amendment 
had been incorporated earlier in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), Justice Stewart’s opinion in 
Elkins distorted what had actually been said in Wolf. See Davies, Mapp, supra note 243, at 626 n.24. 
 268. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 269. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (ruling that “searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). 
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informant’s tip. Under the two-prong Aguilar–Spinelli standard, the Court held 
that a police affidavit seeking a warrant on the basis of a confidential 
informant’s tip must set out, in addition to the factual grounds for probable 
cause, both how the informant had obtained the relevant information and why 
the informant could be believed.270 The justices apparently hoped that this two-
prong standard would provide federal courts with a more-precise test for 
reviewing the constitutionality of warrants issued by state judges. 
On the other hand, the Warren Court also sapped the probable-cause 
standard of much of its substance when it ruled that police need not disclose the 
identity of a “confidential informant,” even to the magistrate from whom a 
warrant was sought, or during a motion to suppress proceeding.271 As a practical 
matter, that ruling seems to have created an opportunity for police to meet the 
so-called “credibility” prong of the Aguilar–Spinelli standard simply by 
perjuriously reciting that a confidential informant had previously provided 
accurate information—or perhaps even by inventing completely fictional 
informant tips.272 
In addition, the Warren Court created an entirely new branch of search-and-
seizure doctrine in 1968 when it ruled in Terry v. Ohio273 that police had the 
authority to temporarily “stop” and “detain” persons whenever the officers had 
“reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity, and could also “frisk” detained 
persons for weapons if they had reasonable suspicion that the person might be 
armed. This new standard was defined to be less demanding than probable 
cause,274 but to require more than a mere hunch on the part of the police. The 
Justices seem to have hoped that the new reasonable suspicion standard would 
extend constitutional regulation to police conduct that was already common 
practice. But because the probable-cause standard turned out to be not very 
demanding in practice, and because Terry stops could produce grounds for 
arrest,275 the net result of the Justices’ invention of the reasonable-suspicion 
justification for less-intrusive detentions and frisks appears to have been a 
 
 270. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (requiring that a search-warrant affidavit based on 
information from a confidential informant state both the way in which the informant acquired the 
information and reasons to support the informant’s credibility); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 
415–18 (1969) (ruling that corroboration of aspects of the informant’s information could not entirely 
replace the required information). 
 271. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534–36 (1964) (motion to suppress); McCray v. 
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311–12 (1967) (probable-cause hearing). 
 272. See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary 
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 102–07 (1992) (noting pervasive police 
perjury in search matters). 
 273. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 274. Notes from the justices’ conference suggest that the justices initially intended to simply rule 
that the police officer in Terry had had probable cause to arrest, but then thought better of it. See 
generally John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Fisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s 
Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749 (1998). 
 275. In Terry itself, the frisk for weapons produced a gun, which provided probable cause to arrest 
and that, in turn, provided authority to conduct a full search incident to arrest. 
DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC 12/22/2010  3:30:17 PM 
Summer 2010]        ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD 59 
substantial further expansion of police power.276 Nevertheless, the remnants of 
the Warren Court majority still declared in 1972 that “[w]e allow our police to 
make arrests only on ‘probable cause’ . . . . Arresting a person on suspicion, like 
arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our system, even when the 
arrest is for past criminality.”277 
 
VII 
THE EVISCERATION AND EXPLOITATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE 
BURGER, REHNQUIST, AND ROBERTS COURTS 
The Warren Court’s extension of the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
to state criminal proceedings fundamentally changed the politics of federal 
criminal justice. Prior to the 1960s, federal constitutional standards had applied 
largely to the sorts of white-collar or revenue prosecutions that did not scare or 
incite the general public. But applying Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure 
standards to the states—plus the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
compelled self-incrimination in Miranda v. Arizona278—meant that street 
criminals could also claim constitutional protections. And that did scare and 
incite the public. Richard Nixon exploited that fear in the 1968 presidential 
election, and a tipping point occurred in criminal procedure when he was able 
to fill four vacancies on the Court between 1969 and 1972 with law-and-order 
appointees.279 Since that change, the interactions of presidential elections and 
vacancies on the Court has produced what seems to be a permanent right-of-
center majority, and the overall result has been a drastic dilution of Fourth 
Amendment protections, including the evisceration of the bare-probable-cause 
standard itself. 
Although the Burger Court majority initially focused on restricting the 
operation of the exclusionary rule,280 several early Burger Court opinions are 
relevant insofar as they characterized bare probable cause as the “touchstone” 
of “Fourth Amendment reasonableness”281 and also embellished the already 
existing myth that bare probable cause had always been the common-law, or 
 
 276. For example, Terry has also provided the doctrinal basis for “protective sweeps” of houses, 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331–35 (1990), and for “frisks” of automobiles for weapons, Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043–46 (1983). 
 277. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972). 
 278. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 279. See generally JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE (2001) (reporting that Nixon made 
opposition to the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings a primary criterion for choosing nominees 
to the Supreme Court). 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v, Janis, 428 U.S. 433 
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 281. The “touchstone” language initially appeared in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) 
(“[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
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even the “ancient,” standard for lawful warrantless arrests.282 In 1975 Justice 
Powell blurred historical and modern citations together to erroneously imply 
that the bare-probable-cause standard for warrantless felony arrests comported 
with “the common-law antecedents” of the Fourth Amendment.283 A year later, 
Justice White also asserted that the “ancient common law rule” permitted an 
officer to make a warrantless arrest “if there was reasonable ground for making 
the arrest.”284 He concluded that “[t]he balance struck by the common law in 
generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without warrant, has 
survived substantially intact.”285 But the Burger Court did not merely distort the 
history of bare probable cause; rather, the conservative majority drastically 
relaxed that standard in the 1983 ruling in Illinois v. Gates.286 
A. Illinois v. Gates 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Gates altered the probable-cause 
standard in several important ways. One was that it totally jettisoned the two-
prong Aquilar–Spinelli requirement as to the kinds of information regarding 
informant tips that had to be presented to a magistrate, and instead held that a 
finding of probable cause was to be assessed on the basis of the “totality of the 
circumstances.”287 That formulation meant that “everything is relevant, [but] 
nothing is determinative.”288 
 
 282. The myth was well established by the time of the Burger Court. For example, Professor Horace 
L. Wilgus imparted a false appearance of historical continuity in a 1924 article by comingling sources 
from Coke and Hale with twentieth-century decisions and presenting them as though they evidenced a 
consistent treatment of “common law” warrantless arrest authority. See generally Horace L. Wilgus, 
Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924). Later commentators continued to reiterate the 
myth. For example, Professor Landynski asserted in 1966 that at common law “[a] felon could be 
apprehended on probable cause alone”—apparently without understanding that in framing-era usage 
the term “felon” denoted the requirement that a felony had actually been committed. JACOB W. 
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 45 (1966). For “ancient,” see Watson 
v. United States, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (discussing the “ancient common law rule”). 
 283. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). 
 284. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418 (citing Hale, Blackstone, Samuel, Beckwith, and Rohan). 
 285. See id. at 421. Justice White made similar claims in his 1980 dissenting opinion in Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 607, 609 (1980) (White J. dissenting) (citing the English ruling in Beckwith and the 
1850 Massachusetts decision in Rohan as though they reflected the “common law” standard for 
warrantless arrests). 
More recently, Justice Scalia has made similar claims. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rohan as though it were authority that common law authorized 
that “a person may be arrested . . . on the basis of probable cause, without an arrest warrant”). And 
additional commentators have done likewise. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Fourth Amendment, 
Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 61, 71 (1996) (erroneously describing 
the post-independence English rulings in Samuel and Beckwith, which expanded the warrantless arrest 
authority of peace officers, as though they reflected framing-era common law and the American 
Framers’ expectations). 
 286. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 287. 462 U.S. at 230. 
 288. Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570 
(1984). 
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Even more importantly, Gates drastically lowered the threshold for finding 
probable cause by jettisoning the traditional criterion of information sufficient 
to justify a prudent person’s strong suspicion or belief in guilt. To accommodate 
the poorly corroborated and even partly erroneous anonymous tip in that case, 
Justice Rehnquist announced that probable cause was satisfied if police had 
information merely indicating a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of 
criminal activity.289 
The police investigation in Gates began with an anonymous letter asserting 
that Sue and Lance Gates were drug dealers who had “over $ 100,000.00 worth 
of drugs in their basement” and who brought drugs to their home by car from 
Florida. The writer predicted that Sue would drive the car to Florida to be 
loaded and then fly home, and that Lance would then fly down and drive the 
loaded car home. But the letter oddly lacked some basic information; in 
particular, the Gates’s address was simply given as “Greenway, in 
Condominiums” without a house number. Moreover, it did not disclose the 
means by which the tipster had obtained this information except by stating that 
“[t]hey brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire 
living on pushers.”290 Nor did the letter indicate whether the tipster had heard 
this personally or whether this was a hearsay report from someone else. Justice 
Rehnquist conceded that the letter alone could not constitute probable cause.291 
Subsequent police attempts to corroborate the tip revealed that the tipster 
was correct on some points, but incorrect on others. The letter arrived too late 
for the police to determine if Sue Gates had traveled as predicted.292 The police 
did confirm, however, that “L. Gates” had a reservation to fly to West Palm 
Beach, Florida, a few days later, and Lance Gates was then observed boarding 
and deplaning from that flight. Significantly, he was then observed entering a 
motel room registered in his wife’s name and was seen the next morning leaving 
“with an unidentified woman” and driving onto a northbound highway in a car 
with a license registered to the couple.293 Although Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
did not confront the point, Sue Gates’s presence in Florida—it was certainly 
highly probable she was the so-called “unidentified woman”—was not only 
contrary to the tipster’s travel prediction but also undercut the claim of a 
quantity of drugs in the Gates’s basement. The odd travel predicted by the 
tipster suggested that one of the couple always stayed at home to protect the 
drugs, but that was not what the police actually observed.294 Moreover, the 
police had merely observed the couple entering a northbound highway. But the 
 
 289. 462 U.S. at 238, 246 (“fair probability” of criminal activity); id. at 244 n.13 (“substantial 
chance” of criminal activity). 
 290. Id. at 225. 
 291. Id. at 227. 
 292. See id. at 225–26 (stating that the police received the anonymous letter on May 3, 1978, the 
same day Sue Gates was supposed to drive to Florida). 
 293. Id. at 226–27. 
 294. Id. at 291–92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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geography of Florida is such that one would do that to go to numerous vacation 
sites such as Sea World as well as virtually anywhere else in North America. 
Thus, the police actually had no significant information as to the Gates’s 
destination when the search warrant was issued for their car and house.295 
In sum, the information the police had at the time they obtained the search 
warrant—which is the time that is relevant for assessing probable cause—
consisted of an anonymous tip that had been shown to be incorrect in important 
ways and uncorroborated in others. Justice Rehnquist would have been hard 
pressed to claim that that information was either “reasonably reliable” or that it 
would have “suffice[d] to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” 
that the Gateses were transporting drugs.296 So he jettisoned that traditional 
definition of probable cause and instead asserted that information that merely 
indicated a “fair probability” of criminal activity would do. Moreover, Gates 
also directed reviewing courts to generally defer to the judgment of the 
magistrate who issued a warrant that probable cause had been shown.297 
To provide precedential support for the “fair probability” formulation, 
Justice Rehnquist exhumed Chief Justice Marshall’s 1813 description of 
probable cause in Locke as “circumstances which warrant suspicion.”298 Justice 
Rehnquist stated that this definition had been given “in a closely related 
context” but did not actually disclose that Locke had articulated probable cause 
in a customs forfeiture proceeding rather than as a standard for a criminal arrest 
or search.299 Nor did he even mention the traditional definition of probable 
cause as sufficient information to warrant a prudent person’s belief in guilt—the 
definition of probable cause that Justices of the Court had recited for nearly a 
century and a half in Munns, Stacey, Carroll, and Brinegar.300 Instead, Justice 
Rehnquist followed the well-established judicial practice of making the history 
seem to fit the desired result. 
In a concurring opinion in Gates, Justice White warned that the Gates fair-
probability formulation threatened to “eviscerate” the probable-cause standard 
 
 295. Id. at 292 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 296. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 297. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (“[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of [the showing of 
probable cause in] an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s 
‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’”). 
 298. Id. at 235 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (affirming 
condemnation of imported goods as forfeit to the government)). In condemnation proceedings, the 
burden of proof was on the person opposing condemnation provided only that that “probable cause is 
shewn for such prosecution.” Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 341–42; see also id. at 348. It seems unlikely, 
though, that Locke would have been regarded as a precedent for criminal procedure when it was 
decided in 1813. See the discussion of Locke, supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
 299. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235. 
 300. See supra notes 217, 226, 229, 230 and accompanying text. The closest Justice Rehnquist came 
to acknowledging the earlier definition was to observe, in a footnote, that the Court had previously 
discussed probable cause in terms of the officer’s “reasonable belief” that a suspect possessed drugs. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 n.7 (citing Ker v. California, 274 U.S. 23 (1963)). 
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for all practical purposes.301 That fear was well-founded: although the 
application of the traditional standard was never overly rigorous in practice, 
lower-court judges have found probable cause to support police arrests and 
searches on extremely marginal grounds under the fair-probability 
formulation.302 
Gates also laid the groundwork for the Burger Court to effectively end 
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment’s explicit ban against the issuance of 
warrants lacking probable cause. A year later, in 1984, the Burger Court 
majority adopted the misnamed “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule 
in United States v. Leon303 and announced that it no longer mattered if there 
actually was probable cause for a warrant; rather, evidence seized pursuant to 
an unconstitutionally issued warrant would be admissible for all purposes 
provided that the police affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”304 That 
is, anything more than a blank or purely conclusory affidavit will suffice to 
admit evidence seized under a warrant.305 After Leon, the probable-cause 
standard itself matters only for assessing the constitutionality of warrantless 
police searches or arrests—and even then the police need to identify only 
circumstances sufficient to indicate a fair probability of criminal activity. 
B. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista and Virginia v. Moore 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have expanded police power in myriad 
ways. But two additional decisions are especially relevant insofar as they exploit 
the Gates fair-probability formulation of bare probable cause. The first is the 
2001 decision of the Rehnquist Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, in which 
the majority upheld a custodial arrest, complete with handcuffs and booking, of 
 
 301. 462 U.S. at 272 (White, J., concurring) (declining to join the majority’s adoption of the “fair 
probability” definition because it “threaten[ed] an evisceration of the probable-cause standard”). See 
also Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 
1061, 1065–70 (1987) (criticizing the Gates formulation of probable cause). 
 302. See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 381 n.482 (listing cases). 
 303. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The exception is misnamed because it has nothing to do with police “good 
faith” in the ordinary meaning of that term. Rather, the Leon opinion consists of a syllogism based on 
false dichotomies. The major premise is that the exclusionary rule was meant to apply only to police 
rather than to magistrates (a false dichotomy); the minor premise is that issuance of an invalid warrant 
is the fault of only the magistrate rather than the police officer (another false dichotomy because police 
initiate the warrant request, and the analysis also totally omits the role of the prosecutor who 
prescreened the warrant application); and the conclusion is that the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
invalid warrants. Thus, the exception would more appropriately be labeled the blame-the-magistrate 
exception. Police conduct is relevant under this analysis only if the departure from legal standards is so 
egregious that no hypothetical officer could have thought that the warrant at issue could be valid. 
 304. Id. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part)). 
 305. The justices previously ruled in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), that a bare 
conclusory claim that a police officer knew of or had information regarding criminal activity, without 
any statement of the factual grounds for that claim, was insufficient to justify issuance of a search 
warrant. That minimal standard may now be the effective standard for “probable cause” as far as 
warrants are concerned. 
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a suburban “soccer mom” who had committed the heinous crime of not wearing 
a seatbelt.306 Justice Souter’s majority opinion held that the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness standard did not limit police authority to make 
arrests (and, by implication, searches of the arrestee’s person and vehicle 
incident to such arrests) for even the most minor regulatory offenses.307 Justice 
Souter’s opinion was noteworthy primarily for its unusually elaborate and 
almost certainly deliberate distortions of framing-era arrest law.308 In particular, 
he ran roughshod over the historical limitation of less-than-felony warrantless 
arrests to “breaches of the peace” and indicated in dicta that the majority was 
inclined to disregard any legal restriction on arrest authority other than the 
Gates fair-probability standard itself—especially the genuinely historical 
restriction of less-than-felony warrantless arrests to instances in which an officer 
actually observed an ongoing offense.309 
Atwater’s dicta became law in the 2009 decision of the Roberts Court in 
Virginia v. Moore.310 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the unanimous Court in that 
case tossed aside the settled prior rule—recognized in Carroll and numerous 
other precedents—that only a lawful arrest can justify a constitutional search 
incident to arrest.311 Instead, the justices announced that the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard authorizes police to arrest whenever they 
have bare probable cause—that is, a fair probability—that an offense of some 
kind has been committed, regardless of whether the law of the jurisdiction 
actually authorizes an arrest for that offense, or permits only the issuance of a 
summons or ticket.312 That is so, according to Justice Scalia’s opinion, because 
bare probable cause is the only constitutional criterion for assessing whether an 
arrest comports with Fourth Amendment reasonableness, so any state criteria 
for lawful arrests other than the probable-cause standard itself are “beyond the 
 
 306. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The majority indicated that Atwater could have been held for up to forty-
eight hours before appearing before a magistrate without a violation of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness. Id. at 352. 
 307. Id. at 354 (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a 
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest 
the offender.”). 
 308. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 274–365 (discussing Justice Souter’s mischaracterizations of 
framing-era arrest law). 
 309. See id. at 382–88. Justice Souter’s Atwater opinion could address that point only in dicta 
because the arresting officer actually had seen the commission of the lack-of-seatbelt offense. 
 310. 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 311. See supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court invented the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll precisely because no lawful warrantless 
arrest could have been made for a misdemeanor violation regardless of probable cause); see also, e.g., 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 , 224–27, 229, 233–36 (1973) (referring repeatedly to 
the doctrine of a search incident to “a lawful arrest” or noting that arrest in the case was “lawful” and 
authorized by local statute). 
 312. 553 U.S. at 177–78. 
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level that the Fourth Amendment requires.”313 After Moore, police can make a 
constitutional search incident to an unlawful arrest!314 
Although Moore might appear to simply reflect the justices’ response to a 
potentially confusing issue of state arrest law,315 it seems highly unlikely that its 
holding will be confined to that setting. Rather, Moore seems to mean that 
police have constitutional authority to make a warrantless arrest and an 
incidental search whenever they have information indicating a fair probability 
that even the most trivial misdemeanor offense has been committed, regardless 
of any restrictions state law places on making arrests for that offense. By 
implication Moore means that the “in the presence” restriction on warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests no longer matters for assessing the constitutionality of a 
warrantless arrest, or of a search made incident thereto, even though that is still 
a statutory requirement for a lawful warrantless misdemeanor arrest in most 
states.316 Bizarrely, it seems that state law defines the existence of an offense, 
and also provides the lawful authority for state officers to enforce the offense, 
but that only the former, and not the latter, matters for Fourth Amendment 
analysis.317 
Moore opens the way for extravagant assertions of police arrest and search 
power. For example, Moore allows police to make a constitutional search 
incident to an arrest for a minor traffic violation for which they are authorized 
by law only to issue a ticket.318 That arrest and search power is significant, 
moreover, because the Justices have previously held that police are also entitled 
to stop a car for a traffic violation as a pretext for investigating the possibility of 
other crime.319 Indeed, it would appear that police can even make a 
 
 313. Id. at 171. 
 314. In Carroll, the justices invented the automobile-search exception to the warrant requirement 
precisely because they recognized that a search-incident-to-arrest could be based only on a lawful 
arrest, and a lawful arrest could not be made in the circumstances. See supra notes 245–50 and 
accompanying text. But in keeping with the judicial tendency to hide departures from prior rulings, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Moore never mentions Carroll, let alone acknowledge the contrary analysis 
in that case. 
 315. The offense observed in Moore would have been arrestable in some counties of Virginia, but 
was not in the county in which Moore was actually arrested. See 553 U.S. at 167. 
 316. At least that was still the case in 2002. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 386 n.499. 
 317. Or perhaps the Court will tell us in a future case that there need not actually even be a legally 
defined offense, but only a “fair probability” that there could be such an offense. For example, if 
American jurisdictions typically make particular conduct an offense, perhaps it will not matter whether 
the jurisdiction in which an arrest or search is made actually defines the conduct to be an offense 
because there was a “fair probability” that it might have been an offense. 
 318. The Court had previously ruled that issuance of a traffic ticket cannot justify a search. See 
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). That ruling now appears to be irrelevant for purposes of applying 
the Fourth Amendment because an officer can make an illegal arrest for a traffic stop and conduct a 
constitutional search incident to that illegal arrest. 
 319. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The allowance of pretextual stops for traffic 
offenses in Whren may also have taken on increased importance as a result of the unanimous decision 
in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), which authorized police to make “inquiries into matters 
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . so long as those inquires do not measurably extend 
the duration of the stop.” Id. at 788. It remains to be seen what “measurably” will mean. 
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constitutional but illegal arrest and incident search based merely on a 
confidential informant’s tip that there is a fair probability that a person had 
driven without a seat-belt on some previous occasion! 
Justice Scalia’s treatment of history in Moore is also noteworthy. Rather 
than attempt the impossible task of documenting that bare probable cause had 
been the framing-era standard for warrantless arrests of any kind (which it was 
not), Justice Scalia—the Court’s leading “originalist”—opted for evasion. 
Specifically, he evaded the historical inquiry by adopting the false posture that 
Atwater had already established that bare probable cause sufficed to justify 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests at the time of the framing and declined to 
discuss the point further.320 So in the Supreme Court, history is reduced to stare 
decisis, and prior distortions are immune to correction regardless of the weight 
of contrary evidence. 
To give the appearance of engaging with history, though, Justice Scalia 
decorated his evasion with gratuitous historical misstatements321 and 
obfuscation. With regard to the latter, he wrote as though the issue was whether 
the purported (but false) original understanding of Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness”—which Atwater had incorrectly portrayed to permit arrests 
for any offenses on bare probable cause—could be limited by additional 
statutory restrictions on arrest authority.322 But that formulation inverted the 
 
 320. Moore, 553 U.S. at 169 n.2. 
 321. In one passage in Moore, Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he immediate object of the Fourth 
Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of assistance that English judges had 
employed against the colonists.” 553 U.S. at 168–69 (emphasis added). The italicized statement is 
historically false. No English judge had any jurisdiction to do anything in the American colonies. The 
litigation regarding the validity of writs of assistance occurred in the colonial courts, and many of the 
colonial judges actually refused to issue writs of assistance. The colonial grievance was against the 
authorization of such writs by parliamentary statutes. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 
29–31. Indeed, one of the English judges, Lord Camden, was a hero to the colonists for condemning 
general warrants in the English Wilkesite cases. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 586, 657–
58. I mention this because it seems highly unlikely that Justice Scalia’s misleading historical claim 
merely reflects carelessness or over simplification. Rather, it dovetails too nicely with the attack on the 
historical warrant requirement that Professor Amar has previously advanced; namely, that the Fourth 
Amendment was meant to discourage the use of warrants because Americans viewed judges as 
oppressors. See id. at 583–88. Justice Scalia and Professor Amar have previously conducted a sort of 
tag-team endorsement of a purported historical “reasonableness” standard. See Davies, Correcting 
History, supra note 3, at 32 n.60. So it will not be surprising if some future opinion asserting that the 
Framers did not value warrants cites this passage in Moore as authority for a historical-sounding claim 
that the Fourth Amendment was actually aimed at curtailing the power of judges. That is how history 
by stare decisis is concocted. 
 322. Moore, 553 U.S. at 167–71. Citing my 1999 article and another work, Justice Scalia wrote that 
“No early case or commentary, to our knowledge, suggested the Amendment was intended to 
incorporate subsequently enacted statutes. None of the early Fourth Amendment cases that scholars 
have identified sought to base a constitutional claim on a violation of a state or federal statute 
concerning arrest.” Id. at 169. That is utterly beside the point because the constitutional provisions 
were meant to restrict legislative encroachments on common-law rights. The crucial question is whether 
Justice Scalia could identify any framing-era authority that permitted a search to be justified on the 
ground that it was made incident to an unlawful arrest. He could not because that claim would have 
been as bizarre in 1789 as it is today. 
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whole purpose of the constitutional protections that address arrest standards; 
they were aimed at protecting the people from expanded arrest authority, not at 
enhancing government arrest power. The genuine history is that the state and 
federal “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions were actually 
meant to require that criminal arrests and searches be justified by more than 
bare probable cause—and far more than a mere “fair probability” of criminal 
activity. Indeed, even if the fictional claim about a historical Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard that Justice Scalia recited in Moore were 
true, his analysis would still invert the Framers’ actual purpose. The Framers 
sought to prevent legislative relaxation of common-law protections, not to 
prohibit legislative reinforcement of those protections. Moore, however, 
subverts the Framers’ purpose of preserving a constitutional right of personal 
security while offering only statist persiflage in its stead. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The authentic history of probable cause shows that “the living Constitution” 
is not a normative issue, but a historical fact. The authentic history of bare 
probable cause is not a story of staunch judicial enforcement of a long-standing 
historical standard. Rather, it is a story of how state and federal judges 
surreptitiously engineered a massive expansion of government arrest and search 
power. Thus, the purportedly originalist claims in recent Supreme Court search-
and-seizure opinions do not track the real history; rather, they conceal it. The 
authentic history of probable cause is the story of how Americans judges, and 
particularly Supreme Court Justices, have effectively destroyed the civil right to 
be free of arbitrary arrest and search. 
However, the moral of the authentic story of probable cause is not to call for 
a return to the historical common-law standards. Far too much has changed 
since the adoption of the Bill of Rights for that. Some relaxation of the 
common-law crime-in-fact requirement was surely necessary for effective law 
enforcement in a complex, largely urban society. The disquieting aspect of the 
authentic history of probable cause is that judges and justices have been 
unwilling to own up to the changes they have made. They have repeatedly 
expanded government police power while pretending to merely adhere to prior 
doctrine. The fact that they have been unwilling to describe their rulings 
honestly suggests that we should be very skeptical as to whether current 
doctrine strikes the right balance between liberty and law enforcement—
especially because it is now difficult to identify meaningful constitutional limits 
on police arrest and search power.323 
 
323.  See Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The 
Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
(forthcoming 2010). 
